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Abstract.(
Nowadays, entrepreneurship has received a large amount of attention in such studies 
as economics, sociology, finance, and public policy. Furthermore, The European Union and 
national government have implemented several policy interventions aimed to encourage new 
firm formation. Entrepreneurial education is now reinforced in schools, colleges, and 
universities. Nevertheless, entrepreneurship remains to be a black box. Making everyday 
decisions on firm organization and management is a complex process, which depends on how 
entrepreneurs perceive the environment and their own entrepreneurial abilities. These 
perceptions influence firm behavior that can be represented by combination of different 
actions.   
The main goal of this doctoral thesis is to examine how entrepreneurial perceptions 
and learning influence entrepreneur preferences for certain actions and thus, how they affect 
firm performance. The first essay aims to understand whether the effectiveness of the policy is 
altered by the behavioral assumption that entrepreneurs are overconfident about their 
entrepreneurial abilities and tend to be overoptimistic in the evaluation of future prospects. 
The essay applies the agent-based model that is a modified version of the financial fragility 
model of Delli Gatti et al. (2005).  The simulation results suggest that the presence of 
misperceptions of entrepreneurial abilities influence the policy outcomes. 
The main purpose of the second essay is to reveal how entrepreneurial perceptions of 
competitive environment influence their preferences for competitive strategies. Competitive 
advantages of firms are defined on the basis of Porter’s (1980) model of generic strategies — 
differentiation and cost leadership. The results of the analysis suggest that perceived threat of 
competition pushes firms to take actions. The preferences for actions are explained by 
available resources such as human capital.  
The third essay aims to evaluate the impact of capital grants given to microenterprises 
operating in the Province of Trento, Italy in 2009 and 2010. The last essay empirically 
illustrates how lack of restrictions imposed on the amount of possible subsidy requests and 
( viii(
fixed eligibility criteria has invoked subsidy-seeking behavior of firms. The results from 
econometric analysis suggest that subsidies have not been able to improve firm performance 
or to increase firm size in 2011. However, a positive effect of subsidies on the propensity to 
invest in training and in marketing and advertising in 2012 has been detected.  ((((((((((((((((((((((
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Chapter.I..
Introduction.((
Nowadays, entrepreneurship has received a lot of attention from researchers, economic 
scholars, politicians, policy organizations, and business institutions. “Entrepreneurship is one of the 
fastest-growing subfields in management research, and is increasingly appearing in economics, 
sociology, anthropology, finance, and even law” (Foss and Klein, 2012, p.23). Authors claim that 
studying and encouraging entrepreneurship are not only the main objectives of research and policy 
organizations (for example, the European Commission, the World Bank, the OECD, agencies involved 
in agricultural and rural development) but also entrepreneurship education becomes to be important at 
colleges and universities.   
However, entrepreneurship is still a black box. Making everyday decisions on firm 
organization and management is a complex process, which depends on how entrepreneurs perceive 
both, the environment and their own entrepreneurial skills and abilities. Meantime, these perceptions 
are based on the amount of knowledge that entrepreneurs have about environment and their own 
entrepreneurial abilities. Several studies have shown that entrepreneurial perceptions are biased. For 
example, Busenitz and Barney (1997) have found that entrepreneurs tend to be more overconfident 
than managers. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) have shown experimentally that the high business failure 
rates might be explained by entrants’ overestimation of their own abilities. 
 Nevertheless, entrepreneurial perceptions are “dynamic” implying that individuals can update 
their beliefs about uncertain prior information over time. For example, recent studies have shown that 
new entrants have little knowledge on their own entrepreneurial abilities and they often tend to be 
overconfident (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Grieco and Hogarth, 2004; Koellinger et al., 2007). Their 
choice of certain actions will depend substantially on their self-evaluation of their talents and abilities. 
On the other hand, incumbents that already gained more experience than start-ups tend to be more 
realistic and less overconfident about their real business abilities (Fraser and Greene, 2006).  
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Moreover, entrepreneurial behavior is not only shaped with entrepreneurial perceptions of their 
own abilities but also with perceptions of environment where firms operate. Kemp and Hanemaaijer 
(2004) claim that entrepreneurial evaluation of competition might also differ among entrepreneurs 
even if they operate in the same environment. Authors argue that the perception of competition is 
subjective and is based on a large amount of information that entrepreneurs need to process. 
Upon this evidence I am proposing a simple scheme of how entrepreneurs make decisions. 
First, entrepreneurs build their perceptions about some real phenomena that are relative to their 
business activities. These entrepreneurial perceptions are heterogeneous and evolving over time. Some 
entrepreneurs might have perceptions that are very close to the real values of some phenomena, while 
perceptions of others might suffer from substantial biases. Then entrepreneurs take certain actions on 
the basis of their subjective perceptions. Even if entrepreneurs operate in the same environment or they 
have very similar skills and abilities, their actions can differ from each other because their perceptions 
are based on different information sets. Finally, actions taken by entrepreneurs may translate in 
particular outcomes like better firm performance or firm exit.  
The process of how entrepreneurs make decisions is a black box. It has a simple construction 
but what is inside this box, nobody knows with certainty. Besides the simplicity of the decision-
making algorithm, not only each component is unknown but also the processes behind them are hidden 
from researchers and policy makers. Recent literature on industrial policy suggests that policy makers 
need to obtain and process a substantial amount of information required for successful policy 
implementation (Pack and Saggi, 2006; Rodrik, 2007).  Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the 
goals of industrial policies are not always being met.  
Current policy instruments may control partially for possible misbehaviors of firms. Some of 
them are aimed to reduce moral hazard risks or, as in the case of capital grants, to impose time 
limitations for non-selling the object of investment financed by public authorities. But there is still lack 
of policy measures, which consider that firm performance and entrepreneurial actions are based on 
entrepreneurial perceptions. As it has been discussed before, these perceptions are often biased. This is 
especially true for start-ups that have little knowledge about environment and their own abilities. 
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Santarelli and Vivarelli (2007) argue that policy makers should take into account that the effectiveness 
of market mechanism can be sometimes distorted by policies targeted towards firms with the highest 
expected failure rates.  
Even if the presence of biased misperceptions might be considered as one of the reasons of why 
not all policy goals are being met, there is also another feature of firm behavior that can hamper policy 
effectiveness. Firm learning that has been widely investigated in the literature might also influence 
results of government intervention. In particular, if the policy scheme is implemented for a long time-
period and the restriction on the allowed amount of subsidy applications is not imposed then 
beneficiaries can learn how to receive additional finance from the public authority. This implies, that 
granted firms could start to follow subsidy-seeking strategy that might result in wasting of public 
money. 
My doctoral thesis aims to examine how entrepreneurial perceptions and learning influence 
entrepreneur preferences to take certain actions and, thus, how they can affect firm performance. In the 
first essay, I present an agent-based approach for ex-ante policy evaluation of the impact of provision 
of credit guarantees to start-ups. The main goal of this research is to understand whether the 
effectiveness of the policy is altered by the behavioral assumption that entrepreneurs are overconfident 
about their entrepreneurial abilities and tend to be overoptimistic in the evaluation of future prospects. 
The agent-based model is a modified version of the financial fragility model of Delli Gatti et al. 
(2005). The novelty of my work resides in the behavioral hypothesis governing entrepreneurs’ 
decisions on the future capital demand.  
In line with the decision-making algorithm discussed above, entrepreneurs take actions on the 
basis of self-evaluation of their entrepreneurial abilities. In this context a firm action is operationalized 
by an entrepreneur desire of future capital, so that, the more biased is entrepreneurial perception, the 
higher is the amount of desired capital. Entrepreneurial perceptions about their business abilities are 
determined in such a way that the younger are the entrepreneurs, the more overconfident about their 
talent and the more willing to take the risky projects they must be. 
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 In this framework, since start-ups are more financially constrained than incumbents, the public 
authority intervenes by guaranteeing part of start-ups loans aimed to reduce the burden of their 
financing costs. Overall, my simulation results suggest that the presence of misperceptions of 
entrepreneurial abilities influence the policy outcomes. For example, I found that, at the industry level, 
policy implementation had a positive effect on the average interest rate in the absence of 
overconfidence, while in its presence this positive effect no longer existed. Furthermore, although the 
policy implementation had a positive effect on firm investment in general, firm investment was much 
lower in the presence of overconfidence that in its absence. As regards the outcomes of taking certain 
actions, higher misperception pushed more firms to exit. 
The second essay aims to reveal how entrepreneurial perceptions of competitive environment 
affect their preferences for competitive strategies. Competitive advantages of firms are defined on the 
basis of Porter’s (1980) model of generic strategies — differentiation and cost leadership. 
Identification of firm’s competitive strategies helps to understand how firms interact with each other. 
In addition, I test whether the choice of certain strategy results in better firm performance measured by 
labor productivity growth. Overall, the results of my analysis suggest that different threat of 
competition perceived by entrepreneurs pushes firms to take actions. However, none of the strategies 
translates in superior firm performance.  
The third essay is focused on evaluation of the impact of capital grants given to 
microenterprises operating in the Province of Trento, Italy in 2009 and 2010. Creating policy 
instruments that will not be hampered by opportunistic behavior of firms has always been a 
challenging task for policy makers. Several scholars argue that one of the possible channels for 
opportunistic behavior of firms might be firm learning about how grants can be obtained (Rodrik, 
2007; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007).  My third essay empirically illustrates how lack of restrictions 
imposed on the amount of possible subsidy applications and fixed eligibility criteria has invoked 
subsidy-seeking behavior of firms.   (
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Chapter.II.
Is.Self.Esteem.Always.a.Good.Mate.for.Entrepreneurs?.A.Story.About.
How.Overconfidence.Can.Alter.Policy.Effectiveness.
2.1.Introduction.(
Young SMEs that are important on many aspects and are considered as the main engine of 
economic growth, at the same time, are often faced with many obstacles, especially, from the financial 
markets. Beck et al. (2005) have found evidence that SMEs suffer most of all from imperfections of 
financial markets and legal system and that these imperfections are the main constraints for their 
growth.  Aghion et al. (2007) have concluded that young firms grow faster in regions with higher level 
of financial development, especially in industries with higher dependence from external finance. 
Angelini and Generale (2008) have found empirical evidence that young firms suffer more from 
financial constraints than incumbents.  
More recently, many researchers have argued that industrial policy that is targeted to support 
young SMEs should be designed in such a way that firm financial constraints will be less harmful for 
firms. This can be justified by providing additional money to those firms that suffer from information 
asymmetry but have possibilities to invest and grow.  However, if the public authority is not able to 
pick the most promising firms, the industrial policy will result in wasting of government financial 
resources.  
Nowadays, one of the key policy instruments aimed to encourage additional lending to SMEs 
and, in particular start-ups, is a credit guarantee scheme (CGS). The main goal of CGSs is to improve 
access to finance by firms by covering a share of the default risk of the loan. In case of default, the 
lender is at least able to recover the value of the guarantee. The main argument in favor of CGSs is that 
they can help financially constrained firms with high growth opportunities to establish long-lasting 
relationships with banks and, thus, can make market imperfections less harmful. Furthermore, credit 
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guarantees can ease financial constraints of start-ups that suffer from lack of competition among banks 
that results in unwillingness of banks to seek for new potential borrowers like start-us.  
On the other hand, it might be possible that CGSs suffer from the main drawback of many 
policies, that is, they are targeted towards the most vulnerable groups with the highest expected failure 
rates (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). Firm success depends a lot on an entrepreneur who plays the 
main role in decision-making process, especially in start-ups.  Thus, in order to avoid sustaining the 
most vulnerable groups, it is necessary for policy-makers to understand what kind of psychological 
attitudes of entrepreneurs might affect the effectiveness of the policy and, in particular, the 
effectiveness of credit guarantee schemes.  
The literature on entrepreneurship has raised the important question as to how subjective 
decision-making influence firm performance and survival. The role of subjective opinions in 
entrepreneurial decision-making has become increasingly important starting with Knight (1921) who 
proposed that in the absence of known odds about success and failure, the business decisions were 
characterized by fundamental uncertainty. Keynes (1936) argue that entrepreneurial optimism play an 
essential role in determining firm success and survival because it pushes entrepreneurs to actions, 
rather than precise risk assessment.  
Recent studies have shown that while making decisions under uncertainty people are more 
likely to be optimistic (Taylor and Brown, 1988) and overconfident in judgment (De Bondt and Thaler, 
1994). Several studies have shown that entrepreneurs tend to be more overconfident (Cooper et al., 
1988, Busenitz and Barney, 1997). Forbes (2005) argues that the degree of overconfidence is a 
function of both individual and contextual variables. Fraser and Greene (2006) have found that 
overconfidence is significantly high among start-ups.  
Based on the recent literature on entrepreneurship and behavioural economics, we suppose that 
firms performance and outcomes dependent on entrepreneur’s decisions that, at the same time, are 
mainly determined by the degree of how entrepreneurs rely on heuristics and biases. In particular, we 
argue that entrepreneurs tend to be overconfident while creating expectations about firms’ future 
outcomes especially if they have little experience in entrepreneurship. In this paper the definition of 
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overconfidence introduced by Busenitz and Barney (1997) is used. The authors define overconfidence 
as a cognitive bias that results in over-optimistic behavior of decision makers while estimating 
probabilities that is especially excessive in the presence of substantial uncertainty and/or lack of 
knowledge necessary to deal with the problem.  Thus, optimism may result in misperception of 
entrepreneurial abilities, so that, this misperception might have two controversial effects: on the one 
hand, the overestimation can initially be beneficial since it pushes entrepreneurs towards actions, and, 
on the other hand, it can eventually result in some misbehaviour since entrepreneurs carry on too risky 
or too big projects with respect to their real capacity to manage them. 
 The effect of overconfidence on firm decisions and performance is especially important for 
start-ups since their owners usually have little entrepreneurial experience. Fraser and Greene (2006) 
have shown that the probability to have misperception of the entrepreneurial talent is higher among 
start-ups and young firms. Similar idea is present in the theories of firm learning proposed by 
Jovanovic (1982), Frank (1988), and Hopenhayn (1992), where the authors argue that firms update 
their beliefs about their efficiency over time so that the bias in the estimation of the abilities 
diminishes. (
Returning back to the literature on industrial policy, the role of subjective decision-making in 
the entrepreneurial behavior or misbehavior has never been investigated in the context of the 
effectiveness of policies targeted to support SMEs or start-ups. Though, the issue of overconfidence is 
relevant for most of start-ups in which entrepreneurs are owners, managers, and decision makers and, 
at the same time, are human beings whose decisions are based on their own heuristics, experience and 
judgments. The presence of overconfidence in entrepreneurial decision-making process plays an 
important role in determining pros and cons of many policy instruments targeted to support start-ups. 
The main rationale and justification for the government support of start-ups is the presence of financial 
constraints that make start-ups’ investment and growth more(burdensome. On the other hand, policy 
makers might support less efficient firms by means of government incentives provided to them and 
might create strong barriers for the functioning of the market selection mechanism.  
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In the next sections we argue that the initial talent misperception and the consequent learning 
have some effects in terms of impact of public policies targeted to start-ups and, in general, to 
financially constrained firms offering them better credit access and better credit conditions in line with 
the OECD and the EU suggestions. In particular, if the program eligibility is only determined on the 
basis of firms’ age, credit guarantee implementation might hamper efficient economic development by 
firms’ overinvestment and government sustain of less efficient entrepreneurs.  
In order to test our hypothesis we employ a modified version of the model by Delli Gatti et al. 
(2005), in which heterogeneous financially fragile firms are confronted with strict financial conditions 
from the banking sector when offering a low collateral or having low net worth values. The model is 
able to replicate a set of both macro and micro stylized facts, and for this reason it can be extended to 
test the influence of talent misperception on the effectiveness of credit guarantee schemes.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, the review of existing 
literature on overconfidence and agent-based approach is presented. Section 2.3 describes our 
theoretical model and policy design. Section 2.4 presents simulation results. Section 2.5 presents 
sensitivity analysis. Section 2.6 concludes and discusses the study.  ((((((((((((((((((((((
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2.2.Literature.review.
!
Misperception of a talent 
!((
The literature on behavioural economics and economic psychology suggests that people 
generally tend to be overconfident when judging their own skills and abilities. Camerer and Lovallo 
(1999) have created experimental entry games in order to show that the high business failure rates 
might be explained by entrants’ overestimation of their own abilities. They also found that 
overconfidence is stronger in the existence of self-selection in the experiment implying the presence 
only of those individuals who were perfectly aware before the experiment that their pay-offs strongly 
depend on their skills and who chose to participate in experiment by themselves. The authors argue 
that this evidence, which suggests that it is hard for an individual to adjust to changes in the reference 
group one competes with, might be related to the psychological phenomenon called the “inside view” 
(Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). The “inside view” is defined as a way of how people tend to deal with 
a problem by using the full knowledge that each individual has on the subject and by focusing on 
specific subject’s features and experience on it. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) defined the opposite 
way of dealing with several issues and tasks as the “outside view”, which is characterized by focusing 
on the statistics of class of cases chosen to be similar to the current one and guessing to which class the 
current case refers.  
Heath and Tversky (1991) have created the “competence hypothesis” in which they propose 
that individuals’ acceptance of ambiguous gambles depends on the level of knowledge in the 
respective field (the competence) perceived by individual. Larrick et al. (2007) have explored how 
self-evaluation of one’s own skills to be better than those of average, the so-called “better-than-
average” effect, is related to overconfidence. The authors have found that the positive relationship 
between better than average perception and overconfidence is present where the better than average 
perception range from worse-than-average to better-than-average effects, and confidence measure can 
range from under confidence to overconfidence. 
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   Entrepreneurs have been considered as particularly overconfident because starting a business 
is a risky choice. Recent literature on overconfidence have related entrepreneurs’ misperception of 
their own abilities to different questions like excess entry (Grieco and Hogarth, 2004; Koellinger et al., 
2007), or insistence in loss situations (Astebro et al., 2007; Burmeister and Schade, 2007; Schade and 
Burmeister, 2009) and its relationship to low and high uncertain choices (Shyti, 2013). Another 
research by Busenitz and Barney (1997) have shown that entrepreneurs and managers in large firms 
differ from each other by overconfidence that they exhibit so that entrepreneurs in large firms tend to 
be more overconfident than managers. Forbes (2005) has shown that entrepreneurs have different 
cognitive biases that should be studied by future research since their existence might give better 
explanation for many observations. Fraser and Greene (2006) have empirically shown that start-ups 
tend to be overoptimistic about their entrepreneurial talents but the degree of optimism diminishes 
over time.  
Very often overconfidence has been related to another cognitive bias — the illusion of control 
— first proposed by Langer and Roth (1975). The individual’s belief in his or her ability to control the 
outcome of an uncertain event can be based upon individual’s perceptions and for this reason might be 
biased in general. Carr and Blettner (2010) have tested whether higher illusion of control leads to 
lower decision quality by entrepreneurs. The authors have found that there is a negative association 
between high level of illusion of control and entrepreneurial decision quality that is moderated by time 
stress and prior experience.  
Although overconfidence has been studied by many authors, it is still not clear whether it has 
positive or negative effect on firm performance and their behavior. The positive effect of 
entrepreneurs’ overconfidence has been found by Van den Steen (2011) and Heller (2014). On the 
other hand, overconfidence might have negative effect on firm performance. For example, Hvide and 
Panos (2014) have found that overconfidence measured by number of trades has a negative effect on 
sales growth. The question of entrepreneurial overconfidence has been raised for the first time by 
Cooper et al (1988) who have found that the vast majority of entrepreneurs believed that their chances 
to succeed were very high. Cooper et al. (1988) suggest that although extreme entrepreneurial 
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optimism may create some obstacles for entrepreneurs in identifying problem areas, choosing the right 
direction for the business or making decisions on closing down the enterprise, optimism can be 
beneficial for entrepreneurs if they make extra effort while conducting a business.  
The remaining aspect of entrepreneurial overconfidence and its consequences on firm 
performance that needs to be explained is whether the perception of entrepreneurial abilities differs 
among nascent and experienced entrepreneurs. Koellinger et al. (2007) argue that a misperception of 
abilities tend to decrease over time when entrepreneurs become more experienced and learn about their 
real entrepreneurial abilities. The authors have used the unique data aimed to represent the random 
sample of populations in different countries and have found that nascent entrepreneurs are in general 
more overconfident than entrepreneurs whose entrepreneurial skills have been already tested by the 
market.  
 
The Agent-based models  
One of the possible tools that can be used to understand how entrepreneurial overconfidence 
might affect policy effectiveness is an agent-based modeling (ABM). The ABM is a computational 
method for simulating environment where agents act and interact with each other. Axelrod and 
Tesfatsion (2006) formulated two main features of the agent-based models: “the system is composed 
of interacting agents; and the system exhibits emergent properties, that is, properties arising from the 
interactions of the agents that cannot be deduced simply by aggregating the properties of the agents” 
(p.3).  The essential component of the ABM is an agent who is characterized by bundled data and 
behavioral rules and can represent individuals (e.g., consumers, sellers, workers), social grouping (e.g., 
families, firms) or institutions (e.g., markets, government).  
The aims pursued by ABM researchers can be divided into four groups: empirical 
understanding, normative understanding, qualitative insight and theory generation, and 
methodological advancement (Tesfatsion, 2006). Researchers whose main goal is empirical 
understanding try to reveal how existing regularities evolve and exist and whether or not they can be 
explained through the process of agents’ interaction.  ABM researchers pursuing as an objective 
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normative understanding try to imitate the salient aspects of an economic system and agents operating 
in this system and by this try to understand whether or not socially desirable and effective outcomes of 
policy designs and institution development can be achieved. Qualitative insight and theory generation 
group is aimed to define a full range of potential behavior of a system so that it is possible to 
understand the emergence of some existing regularities as well as reasons of non-occurrence of others. 
Researchers who pursue the methodological advancement as an objective try to develop different 
methods and tools that are targeted to improve and validate an agent-based approach.  
Agent-based models have been applied to solve problems in economics, management, 
sociology, political economy, and financial economics. The recent development of computational 
procedures helps understand better firms' investment activities and innovation strategies by applying 
agent-based models to this context. For example, Gilbert, Pyka and Ahrweiler (2001) have designed an 
agent-based model of innovation networks. Their main goal was to reproduce main features of 
innovation networks of two sectors: personal and mobile communications and biotechnology. Zhang 
(2003) has designed a model that imitates Silicon Valley-type industrial clusters in order to determine 
the origin of high-tech industrial clusters in a landscape in which no firms existed originally. The 
author argues that the main factor that determines the emergence of this kind of clusters is 
entrepreneurial spirit that may spread across habitants through social effects.  
In the past ten years several studies have raised the question of possible application of ABMs to 
policy issues, such as, evaluation of short and long run effects of different policy designs. European 
research group that has developed a macroeconomic model EURACE ('An Agent-based Software 
Platform for European Economic Policy Design with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents: New Insights 
from a Bottom Up Approach to Economic Modeling and Simulation’) have made a large contribution 
to this field. EURACE model is aimed to simulate the European economy and to focus on European 
policy analysis. 
               Dosi, Fagiolo and Roventini (2010) have developed the model with the similar structure that 
is aimed to investigate the properties of macroeconomics dynamics and to estimate the impact of 
public policies. The model extends authors’ previous model (Dosi et al. 2006, 2008) of 
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macroeconomic dynamics where heterogeneous firms interact with each other by producing 
consumption goods and machines for production.  The model presented in 2010 is aimed to evaluate 
the impact of policy under two regimes: Schumpeterian and Keynesian, where the former is aimed to 
foster innovation and the latter is aimed to foster demand growth through the mechanism of public 
fiscal policy. The authors have concluded that in order to promote economic growth government 
should implement both types of policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
.(((((((((((((((((((((((((
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2.3.The.model.(
The model is based on the agent-based model aimed to represent financial fragility and 
business fluctuations of Delli Gatti et al. (2005). It describes the functioning of a single industry of 
relevant size, populated by !!firms, heterogeneous in size, and producing the same good. Firms are not 
faced with any technological change, and the industry is characterized by constant returns to scale. 
Moreover, entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their inner entrepreneurial talent and in the prior beliefs 
about their own entrepreneurial abilities.  
Firms that are not able to finance their desired investment by their internal funds ask for a loan 
on the credit market. The credit market is composed by a banking sector that, in the presence of 
asymmetric information, allocates the limited amount of bank financial resources among firms by 
providing loans on the interest rate individual to each firm. 
 
Entrepreneurs)
)
)
Entrepreneurs have limited and vague knowledge about their entrepreneurial talent, !!. When 
they start their businesses they construct heterogeneous prior beliefs, (!!∗), about their entrepreneurial 
abilities. Then, over time they update their beliefs on the basis of the results of business activities. In 
particular, recalling (Fraser and Greene, 2006), it is assumed that the younger the entrepreneurs, the 
more overconfident they are, implying that their beliefs differ substantially from their real talent values 
( !!"#∗ ≫ !! ). The degree of misperception reduces along with increasing experience in firm 
management, so that, the older the entrepreneurs the more realistic they become (!!"#∗ > !!).  
Beliefs are updated following a Bayesian mechanism based on entrepreneurs specific 
information set evolving over time. In each time period, the information set !!"of entrepreneur i is 
determined as the summation of all her information sets available up to t,    !!"= !!"/!!!!! ,                                      (2.1) 
where !!" is the information set specific to each firm i and different at time l (l=1,…,t). 
Then, the updating rule takes the form:  
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!!"∗ = !!"!!" + !!"(1− !!")                 (2.2) 
where !!" is the entrepreneur’s prior belief about her own talent that is assigned randomly so that 
younger agents have larger values of !!"!than older ones. The parameter !!"!captures the variability of 
the information set and of the real talent distribution. !!" = ( !!!!)! + !!!!                                (2.3) 
where !! !and!!!!! are the standard deviations of entrepreneur’s information set  !!" and of her real 
talent !! respectively.  
 
Firms  
 At the beginning of each period, firms produce output by means of a linear production 
technology with one input – capital !!". The output produced by firm i is given by  !!" = !!!!!" ,                                     (2.4) 
where ! is capital productivity that is constant and uniform across firms. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that capital stock never depreciates.  
The limitation of firms’ knowledge of market conditions results in uncertain prices of the 
product sold by firms so that individual selling price is determined by  !!" = !!"!! ,                                        (2.5) 
where !!!is the average market price, !!" is a random idiosyncratic shock. Firms are price takers. For 
the sake of simplicity, the assumptions that !! = 1!and!! !!" = 1 are held.  
Another assumption made in the model claims that firms cannot obtain external money on the 
stock market because they are fully rationed on it. This implies that firms can finance their capital 
stock either by means of their own internal funds – net worth !!" – or by means of credit !!"!obtained 
from a bank. Assuming that firms have long-term contractual relationship with banks, firms’ debt 
commitments in real terms are equal to !!"!!" , where !!" is the real interest rate. For the sake of 
simplicity, it is assumed that !!"is also the real return on net worth, so that firms’ financing costs are 
equal to 
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!"!" = !!" !!" + !!" = !!"!!" .         (2.6) 
Total variable costs are proportional to the financing ones and equal to !"!" = !"!"!!", with g 
>1. Then, the real profit is given by  !!" = !!!!"!!" − !!!"!!" = (!!!!"! − !!!")!!",      (2.7) 
where !! is the entrepreneurial talent specific to each individual. Firm i’s expected profit is 
     ! !!" = ! !! ! − !!!" !!" = !!"∗! − !!!" !!" .      (2.8) 
 i.e, expectations about the firm’s future profit depend on the entrepreneurs’ perceptions about their 
own talent. 
In the model we allow only firms with non-negative net worth values to stay in the market. By 
the law of motion of the net worth and the assumption that all the profits are retained, firm’s net worth 
is determined as the sum of previous period net worth and current period profits:  !!" = !!!!! + !!".                              (2.9) 
Then, the bankruptcy condition is given by !!"!! + !!!!"!!!" − !!!"!!" < 0,      (2.10) 
so that firms exit from the market when  !!!" = !!!!" (!!!" − !!"!!!!" ) ≡ !!" .         (2.11) 
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that !!!" is a random variable with a uniform distribution, with 
support (0,2). Then, the probability of bankruptcy is given by  
Pr !!" < !!" = !!"!! = !! !!!!" !!!" − !!"!!!!" .     (2.12) 
Following Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990, 1993) it is assumed that bankruptcy is costly and, in 
particular, bankruptcy costs are a quadratic function of firm’s output, !! = !!!"! with c > 0.  
Then, firm i’s problem is characterized by  max(!(!!")− !! Pr !!" < !!" )       (2.13) 
Recalling equations (2.8) and equation (2.12) is given by: 
 max( !!"∗! − !!!" !!" − !!! !!!"! !!!!" !!!" − !!"!!!!" ) .     (2.14) 
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The objective function of the firm i is   Γ!" = !!"∗!!!" − !!!"!!" − !"!!!" !!!"!!"! − !!"!!!!" .            (2.15) 
From the first order condition, the optimal capital stock at time t results to be !! !"! = (!!"∗ !!!!!")!!"!"#!!" + !!"!!!!!!".                 (2.16) 
Then, firm’s investment is given by  !!" = !!"! − !!".                                  (2.17) 
Firms can finance their investment either by their internal funds, that is their previous period profits, !!"!!, or if needed by bank loans, ∆!!", where ∆!!" = !!" − !!"!!.  
Making use of (2.6), (2.9) and (2.16), the demand for credit is equal to  !!!!"! = (!!"∗ !!!!!")!!"!"#!!" − !!"!! !!!!!!"!!!!" − !!" .     (2.18) 
Banks 
 
The credit market in the model is represented by a single bank that provides firms with bank 
loans on the interest rate !!" specific to each firm. All firms operating in the market are well informed 
about possibilities of obtaining external finance from the bank. The bank’s balance sheet is given by !!! = !! + !!,                                    (2.19) 
where !!!is the total credit supply, !! is the bank’s equity base and !!are deposits determined here as 
residuals. The credit supply is regulated by a prudential rule for which !!! = !!!!/!, where ! is the risk 
coefficient. This rule implies that the aggregate supply is positively correlated with financial health of 
the bank.  
The amount of credit offered by the bank to each firm depends on firm’s size and the amount of 
net worth that firms had in a previous time-period:  !!!"! = !!!! !!"!!"!!!!!! + (1− !)!!! !!"!!!!!!               (2.20) 
with K!!! = !!"K!"!!!!!!!!! , A!!! = A!"!!!!!!!!! , and 0 < λ < 1. The parameter !!" is a firm specific 
indicating how much the debt contract is collateralized. Indeed, if the borrower defaults on a loan, the 
borrower forfeits to the lender the property pledged as collateral. Most debt contracts, including 
( 18(
mortgages and corporate debt, are collateralized. When the borrower fails to either repay or meet some 
conditions of the loan, the lender has the right to sell collateral (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011).  
 The equilibrium interest rate for the ith firm is determined as credit demand (2.18) equals 
credit supply (2.20) that is: 
r!" = !!!"∗ !!"!!!!"!!!"#[!!"!!!!!"!!!"!!!!!!(!!!"!!"!!!(!!!)!!"!!)],         (2.21) 
where k!"!! and α!"!!are the ratios of individual to total capital and net worth, respectively. 
It is assumed that the banks’ equity gives the returns equal to the average of lending interest 
rates !!, as well as deposits are remunerated with the borrowing rate !!!, determining the banks’ profit (!!!) as 
         !!!!! = !!"!!"! − !![ 1− ! !!!! + !!!!]!∈! ,        (2.22) 
where 1/ 1− !  is the spread between lending and borrowing rates. The parameter ! is required to 
represent the degree of competition in the banking sector so that high values of ! imply the higher 
monopolistic power of the banks.  
Banks suffer from the bankruptcy of firms because they loose a part of their own funds given 
by  
  !!" = !!" − !!"!!",                           (2.23) 
if the firm i is drawn from the subset of bankrupt firms Ω!.  !!" is called bad debt. The law of motion 
determines the equity base of the banking system as  
     !! = !!! + !!!! − !!"!!!∈!!!! .             (2.24) 
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The)public)authority)
In the model the public authority implements the Credit Guarantee Scheme each period in order 
to solve the problem of financial constraints faced by start-ups. The protection individually offered by 
the public authority covers up to 80 percent of the losses in the case of default of the firm. Eligible 
firms include all firms whose age is less than five years with an interest rate higher than the average 
one. After policy introduction the parameter of the collateral !!"! !is substituted by a new one !!"! , so that 
for eligible firms the new parameter of the collateral increases (!!"!=0.8), while for non-eligible firms it 
remains unchanged (!!"!=!!"!). Indeed, recalling equation (2.21) an increase of !!"!  lowers the interest 
rate. 
 The amount of public fund is determined endogenously. The model is designed in such a way 
that the public authority has infinite amount of money stored in the public fund. This means that the 
public authority is able to fully finance all firms that applied for incentives and accepted by the 
government selection criteria. Two scenarios of policy implementation are considered in the model: 
when entrepreneurs perceptions of their own entrepreneurial abilities are biased and not. 
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Sequence of events (
1. Firms produce homogenous goods, the outcome depends on the amount of current capital stock 
and real entrepreneurial talent. 
2. Firms calculate desired capital and investment as a result of firm expected profit maximization. 
The expected profits depend on firm beliefs about their entrepreneurial talent. 
3. Firms might finance their investment either by means of internal funds – i.e. using net worth – 
or by means of bank loans. 
4. Total credit supply is a multiple of the banks’ equity base. Banks must comply with some 
regulatory constraints.  
5. Individual credit supply is allotted proportionally to firm capital stock and cash available to 
serve the debt. Debt contract is collateralized. 
6. The interest rate is derived from the equilibrium of the individual credit supply and demand. 
The interest rate depends on firm beliefs.  
7. The public authority sustains financially constrained start-ups by increasing the value of the 
collateral.  
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2.4.Simulation.results..(  
In line with the literature on the ABM, we implemented the Monte Carlo analysis in order to 
remove across-simulation variability. The reported results are based on 100 Monte Carlo replications 
with 200 time-periods and 300 firms of each case of the model. As it is quite common in the ABMs, 
the first 50 simulated periods have not been considered in the analysis of simulation results. The basic 
assumptions and procedures of the model are described in Appendix. The parameter settings are 
reported in Table 2.1. As in the model of Russo et al. (2007) we did not properly calibrate the model 
because our main interest lies in the accessing the qualitative features of the model.  
[insert Table 2.1 here] 
First, we analyze the effect of the credit guarantee scheme on several outcomes: the average interest 
rate, average exit rate, and the aggregate investment. In order to check for equalities of means of 
output data in the two scenarios — when the CGS is implemented and not, the Wilcoxon signed rank 
tests has been implemented. 
The results reported in Table 2.2 suggest that the average interest rate has decreased after CGS 
implementation in the absence of overconfidence and it has remained unchanged in the presence of 
overconfidence. This suggests that the main goal of the CGS —the decrease of the average interest rate 
has only been achieved in the absence of biased entrepreneurial beliefs. When overconfidence exists 
banks charge more overconfident entrepreneurs with higher interest rates that results in a policy failure 
of decrease of the average interest rate. With respect to aggregate investment, firm investment has 
slightly increased in both cases – when overconfidence is present and not. Although the policy 
implementation had a positive effect on firm investment in general, firm investment is much lower in 
the presence of overconfidence that in its absence. The exit rate has also increased in both scenarios, 
particularly strongly in the presence of overconfidence that in its absence.  
[insert Table 2.2 here] 
Since the CGS is aimed to support start-ups, the results of policy implementation are in 
extension explored separately for two groups: start-ups and incumbents. Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 (Row 
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1) report the results of credit guarantee implementation on investment of start-ups and incumbents 
respectively. The results suggest that the effect of the credit guarantee scheme on start-ups’ investment 
is similar to the previously found positive effect of the policy on firms’ total investment — the total 
investment of young firms has increased in the presence and absence of overconfidence. In the 
presence of overconfidence incumbents’ total investment does not vary between two scenarios, while 
in its absence incumbents’ investment is higher when the CGS is introduced.  
[insert Table 2.3 here] 
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 (Row 2 and 3) report the effect of the credit guarantee scheme on start-
ups’ and incumbents’ interest and exit rates respectively. The difference in the average interest rate 
when the CGS is implemented and not is statistically insignificant for start-ups regardless of the 
presence and absence of overconfidence. As it can be seen in Table 2.4, in the presence of biased 
beliefs about entrepreneurial talent CGS implementation leads to a higher average interest rate charged 
by incumbents. This can be explained by a much higher exit rate of start-ups in the presence of 
overconfidence that at the same time has a negative affect on the total credit supply. The results 
reported in Table 2.3 suggest that the exit rate of start-ups has increased in the absence and presence of 
overconfidence, while the exit rate of incumbents has increased only in the absence of overconfidence. 
There is no statistically significant effect of the CGS on the exit rate of incumbents when 
entrepreneurial beliefs are biased.  
[insert Table 2.4 here] 
The dynamics of the main outcomes in the presence and absence of the CGS in two scenarios 
— when the overconfidence exists and not is presented in Figure 2.1-2.6. Figure 2.1 refers to the case 
of unbiased beliefs and presents the time series of firm investment when the policy is implemented and 
not. Firm investment dynamics in the presence of overconfidence is slightly different from those in the 
absence of biased beliefs. As it can be seen in Figure 2.1, firm investment is slightly increasing over 
time only in the presence of the CGS while firm investment remains constant in the absence of the 
government intervention.  In contrast, Figure 2.4 shows that in the presence of overconfidence two 
trends of investment dynamics are parallel.  
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Figures 2.2 and 2.5 show the dynamics of interest rates without and with overconfidence 
respectively. In the case of unbiased entrepreneurial beliefs, the interest rate has no trend in both cases 
and its fluctuations slightly decrease over time. When overconfidence exists the dynamics of the 
interest rate changes dramatically: although, the interest rate remains constant over time, its 
fluctuations have higher amplitude in the presence of overconfidence. The dynamics of the exit rate in 
the presence of overconfidence is similar to those in the absence of overconfidence except that has an 
increasing trend in the scenario with zero overconfidence and policy existence.  
Next, we turn out to the analysis of the policy effects among start-ups and incumbents 
separately. Figures 2.7 and 2.13 show the time-series of start-ups’ investment when entrepreneurs have 
zero and positive bias respectively. The dynamics of start-ups’ investment is similar with the 
investment dynamics discussed above. Figure 2.11 and 2.17 show the time-series of start-ups’ exit rate 
in the absence and presence of overconfidence respectively. The dynamics of start-ups’ exit rate is also 
similar with those of the whole population of firms. As it can be seen in Figures 2.9 and 2.10, the 
dynamics of the interest rate of start-ups and incumbents in the absence of overconfidence does not 
differ significantly between two scenarios — when the CGS is implemented and not, while in the 
presence of overconfidence (Figures 2.15 and 2.16) the dynamics of interest rate of incumbents differs 
between these two scenarios.  
As regards the indirect effect of the CGS among incumbents, the CGS has affected the exit rate 
of incumbents in the case of unbiased entrepreneurial beliefs. Figure 2.12 shows that the exit rate is 
higher during the last 50 simulated periods in the case of existence of the CGS than in the case of its 
absence. Although the CGS was not targeted directly towards incumbents, it has changed their exit 
rates because the policy has influenced the market selection mechanism. Overall, as it can be seen in 
Figures 2.11, 2.12, 2.17 and 2.18, the dynamics of the exit rates in the case of unbiased entrepreneurial 
beliefs is characterized by existence of higher-amplitude fluctuations during the first 50 simulated 
periods and lower-amplitude fluctuations during the next 50 periods, while in the case of biased 
entrepreneurial beliefs the amplitude of fluctuations is still high but quite constant over time.   (
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2.5.Sensitivity.analysis..(
Sensitivity analysis plays an essential role in simulation models since it helps understand the 
influence of model inputs on outcome variables and how robust the model to input uncertainty (Thiele 
et al., 2014).  The uncertainties of inputs in the model are assumed to be of low importance if there are 
no large changes in model outputs when model parameters are varying. Otherwise, the model should 
be calibrated on the base of empirical values (Bar Massada & Carmel 2008; Schmolke et al. 2010). In 
this section we perform local sensitivity analysis, that is, a one-factor-at-time analysis with a small 
variation of parameters across all time-periods. The parameters used in sensitivity analysis and their 
based values and their ranges are reported in Table 2.5.  
Table 2.6 presents the sensitivity of the results when the collateral !!"! varies from 0.5 to 0.7 
and the collateral increased by the policy remains the same as in a benchmark model (!!"! = 0.8). A 
lower value of collateral (!!"! = 0.5) results in a more severe conditions of the debt contract so that in 
this scenario firms appear to be more financially constrained. The opposite is true for a higher value of 
collateral (!!"! = 0.7) — the higher is collateral the less burdensome are the conditions of the debt 
contract.  The results presented in Table 2.6 confirm this condition: firm investment is lower when the 
debt contract is stricter (!!"! = 0.5) and is higher when the value of collateral is higher (!!"! = 0.7). 
With respect to the average interest rate sensitivity, Table 2.7 shows that in the absence of 
overconfidence a lower value of the collateral parameter results in a higher average interest rate 
charged by firms while in the presence of biased beliefs a stricter condition of the debt contract results 
in a lower value of the interest rate.  This is mainly explained by the higher exit rate of firms when the 
conditions of the debt contract are less severe. Table 2.8 shows that when entrepreneurial beliefs are 
biased and the collateral parameter has the lowest value, the exit rate of firm is substantially high 
implying a lower value of the total credit supply and, thus, a higher value of the average interest rate.   
In order to check how much the results are sensitive for the change of the collateral increased 
by a policy maker the sensitivity analysis has been extended by varying the value of !!"! . Table 2.9 
shows that firm investment is an increasing function of !!"!  regardless of the presence or absence of 
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overconfidence. When the value of collateral increased by a policy maker increases slightly (!!"! = 0.9) 
there is no statistically significant difference between two scenarios. When the scenario of the full 
repayment of the debt by the government is considered (!!"!=1.0), the collateral secured fully by the 
government leads to a lower value of the average interest rate than those referring to the case of 80 
percent of debt repayment by the government. The exit rate of firms is an increasing function of !!"! , so 
that the higher is the value of collateral secured by the government the higher the exit rate of firms is.  
In addition, the analysis of the sensitivity of the results has been performed by varying the risk 
coefficient parameter. Table 2.10 shows that firm investment is a decreasing function of the risk 
coefficient in the absence of overconfidence. On the other hand, when the overconfidence is present 
and the CGS is implemented the form of the relationship between firm investment and the risk 
coefficient is U-shaped. In the presence of overconfidence and in the absence of the policy firm 
investment slightly increases when the parameter value increases from 0.5 to 0.6 but remains constant 
when the parameter value increases from 0.6 to 0.7. The form of the relationship between the average 
interest rate and the risk coefficient parameter depends on the presence and absence of overconfidence 
as well as on the presence and absence of the policy. Table 2.10 shows that in the absence of 
overconfidence and the policy firm investment is an increasing function of the risk coefficient 
parameter while in all other scenarios it has a U-shaped form. With respect to the exit rate, it is 
sensitive to the change of the parameter only in the absence of overconfidence and when the value of 
the parameter changes from 0.6 to 0.7.  
 Finally, we focus on the impact of the variable cost parameter on the sensitivity of the results. 
Table 2.13 shows that firm investment is a decreasing function of the variable cost parameter in all 
scenarios. The same is true for two other outcome variables — the average interest and exit rates, 
values of both of them decrease with the increase of the variable cost parameter.   
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2.6.Discussions.and.conclusions..(
Schwartz and Clements (1999) argue that main motives for government intervention can be 
divided into three main categories: relief from market imperfections, exploiting economies of scale in 
production and sustaining the social policy objectives, such as changing income distribution or 
increasing employment. Nowadays, information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders of funds 
that are referred to the problem of market imperfections can be considered as one of the most serious 
obstacles. It is a common practice in tackling the problem of information asymmetry by the European 
Union and national governments to provide firms by credit subsidies in the form of credit guarantees. 
Recent studies on policy evaluation have investigated whether the CGSs were effective or not 
in improving firm access to additional finance and increasing firm investment. The empirical evidence 
of the results of credit guarantee schemes is mixed. Hancock, Peek and Wilcox (2007) have evaluated 
the impact of credit guarantees provided in the U.S by the Small Business Administration and have 
found positive effect of this kind of incentives on employment and firms' outcomes. Kang et al. (2008) 
have investigated the effect of credit guarantee schemes in Korea and have found that even if firms' 
productivity and sales increased CGS did make financial constraints of efficient SMEs less severe. The 
evidence of positive effect of credit guaranties has been discovered by Zecchini and Ventura (2009), 
who have evaluated the impact CGS for SMEs implemented in Italy. The authors have concluded that 
credit guarantee in Italy have started to be effective in easing SMEs financial constraints. 
Our simulated results suggest that the effectiveness of the CGS is hampered by entrepreneurial 
overconfidence. In particular, the average interest rate has decreased only in the absence of 
overconfidence while in its presence it has remained unchanged. Furthermore, the average interest rate 
is higher in the presence of overconfidence than in its absence regardless of the policy existence. This 
is explained by the model design: banks are able to observe entrepreneurial beliefs about their real 
talents and in the case of presence of entrepreneurial misperception those entrepreneurs are charged by 
higher interest rate on the credit market. The existence of higher average interest rate in the presence 
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of overconfidence results in lower aggregate investment of firms regardless of CGS implementation. 
With respect to the exit rate, the CGS has increased the exit rate of firms in both scenarios: when the 
overconfidence is present and not. In general, entrepreneurial overconfidence substantially increases 
firm exit rate.  
   Overall, our results suggest that, the policy design based on the main criteria for policy 
eligibility — being a financially constrained start-up should be improved by highly selective 
mechanisms in order to avoid wasting of public funds. Without careful firms’ scanning, policy 
implementation might distort the post-entry market selection of the most efficient entrepreneurs. The 
excess entry of too overconfident entrepreneurs leads to a higher firm exit rate that at the same time 
has a negative affect on the aggregate credit supply and, thus, results in creating financial constraints 
for the most efficient firms. Our conclusions are in line with what Santarelli and Vivarelli (2007) 
suggest: “subsidies should be conditional on an obvious and unambiguous occurrence of a market 
failure (such as capital market imperfections) which prevents otherwise efficient firms from becoming 
established and growing. Hence, entry subsidies should be allowed only in exceptional situations, 
while in “normal times” policy makers should refrain from artificially supporting new firm formation”  
(p.474). 
 
 
 ((
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Appendix.A..((
The case when entrepreneurs are fully informed about their real talents (without 
overconfidence) and without credit guarantee implementation is a “benchmark” case of the model. The 
initial values of the basic variables of the simulation are defined at time t=1. The firm age distribution 
is exponential initialized at time t=1.  
 
TABLE&2.1&PARAMETER&SETTING&(
Acronyms Parameter’s description Parameter’s values !!!!!!!!!!!!!!  Capital productivity 0.1 
c The parameter of the bankruptcy equation 1 
g The variable cost parameter 1.1 !!!!!!!!!!!!!  The mark down on interest rate 0.002 
λ The weight the bank gives to the capital 
in allotting the credit supply 
0.7 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! The risk coefficient 0.5 !!"! ( Collateral  0.6  !!"! ( Collateral increased by policy maker 0.8 ((((((((((((!! Standard deviation of entrepreneur’s 
information set 
0.25 
!! 
 
 
 ! 
Standard deviation of entrepreneur’s real 
talent 
Mean parameter of the exponential firm 
age distribution 
0.03 
 
7.039 
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TABLE&2.2&DESCRIPTIVE&STATISTICS&OF&THE&OUTCOME&VARIABLES&WITH&AND&WITHOUT&CGS&
 
 Without CGS With CGS 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Investment 
No 
Overconfidence 
47.89 12.40 49.65*** 13.22 
Overconfidence 11.7 1.23 13.81*** 1.33 
Interest Rate 
No 
Overconfidence 
.14119** .00308        .14112 .00298 
Overconfidence .22089 .00199         .22114 .00158 
Exit Rate 
No 
Overconfidence 
13.29 6.02 13.51*** 5.83 
Overconfidence 19.87 2.84 20.81*** 2.24 
Note: the difference between two scenarios with and without the CGS is * significant at 5 %, ** 
significant at 1%, *** on the basis of the Wilcoxon signed rank tests 
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TABLE&2.3&DESCRIPTIVE&STATISTICS&OF&THE&OUTCOME&VARIABLES&WITH&AND&WITHOUT&CGS:&START;UPS&
 
 Without CGS With CGS 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Investment 
No 
Overconfidence 
36.87          13.78         38.54*** 14.27 
Overconfidence 9.26           1.33 11.42*** 1.40 
Interest rate 
No 
Overconfidence 
        .12163        .02102        .12154         .02051 
Overconfidence .19488        .00957        .19485 .00691 
Exit Rate 
No 
Overconfidence 
          2.65          1.69        2.73*          1.64 
Overconfidence 6.37          1.50        7.4***            1.4 
Note: the difference between two scenarios with and without the CGS is * significant at 5 %, ** 
significant at 1%, *** on the basis of the Wilcoxon signed rank tests 
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TABLE&2.4&DESCRIPTIVE&STATISTICS&OF&THE&OUTCOME&VARIABLES&WITH&AND&WITHOUT&CGS:&INCUMBENTS&
 
 Without CGS With CGS 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Investment 
No 
Overconfidence 
         11.01          4.33         11.10*           4.11 
Overconfidence 2.43          .23          2.39 .21 
Interest rate 
No 
Overconfidence 
        .13947          .00174        .13943         .00165 
Overconfidence  .22110   .0011    .22152***       .00086 
Exit Rate 
No 
Overconfidence 
       10.59              4.58         10.77**              4.41 
Overconfidence         13.52 2.16         13.4              1.55 
Note: the difference between two scenarios with and without the CGS is * significant at 5 %, ** 
significant at 1%, *** on the basis of the Wilcoxon signed rank tests 
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TABLE&2.5&&MODEL&PARAMETERS&USED&IN&SENSITIVITY&ANALYSIS&(
Parameter Description Base value Min Max !!"! Collateral –without policy 0.6 0.5 0.7 !!"!  Collateral – increase in 
collateral by policy-maker 
0.8 0.8 1 
! The risk coefficient 0.5 0.5 0.7 
g The variable cost parameter 1.1 1 1.3 
 
 
 
!
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TABLE&2.6&FIRM&INVESTMENT&OBTAINED&FROM&SENSITIVITY&ANALYSIS:&THE&COLLATERAL&PARAMETER&!!"! &IS&VARYING&
AND&!!"! =0.8..
Collateral 
 
Zero overconfidence Overconfidence 
!!" Without CGS With  CGS Without CGS With  CGS 
 Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev 
0.5 31.95***  7.16 22.59*** 9.05  7.09***  .73  7.16***  .82 
0.6  47.89 12.40 49.65 13.22 11.7 1.23 13.81 1.33 
0.7 66.83***  17.01 68.68*** 18.04 57.41***  8.72 84.13*** 16.31 
Note: the scenario with !!"! = 0.6 is a benchmark scenario; the difference between the varying scenario 
and the benchmark case is * significant at 5 %, ** significant at 1%, *** on the basis of the Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests 
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TABLE&2.7&&FIRM&INTEREST&RATE&OBTAINED&FROM&SENSITIVITY&ANALYSIS:&THE&COLLATERAL&PARAMETER&!!"! !IS&VARYING&
AND$!!"! =0.8.&
Collateral  
 
Zero overconfidence Overconfidence !!" Without CGS With  CGS Without CGS With  CGS 
 Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev 
0.5 .14215*** .00320 .14205*** .00316 .21632*** .00223  .21631*** .00219 
0.6  .14119 .00308 .14112 .00298  .22089 .00199 .22114 .00158 
0.7 .14042***  .00256 .14035 .00255  .22441** .00122 .22272*** .00115 
Note: the scenario with !!"! = 0.6 is a benchmark scenario; the difference between the varying scenario 
and the benchmark case is * significant at 5 %, ** significant at 1%, *** on the basis of the Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests 
 
 
 
 
TABLE&2.8&FIRM&EXIT&RATE&OBTAINED&FROM&SENSITIVITY&ANALYSIS:&THE&COLLATERAL&PARAMETER&!!"! !IS&VARYING&AND&!!"! =0.8.&
Collateral Zero overconfidence Overconfidence 
!!" Without CGS With  CGS Without CGS With  CGS 
 Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev 
0.5 10.85*** 5.90 11.07***  5.83 15.22***    2.23 15.26***   2.31 
0.6  13.29 6.02  13.51    5.83 19.87 2.84 20.81  2.24 
0.7 15.89*** 5.33 16.21*** 5.35 40.2*** 3.62 47.57***  5.20 
Note: the scenario with !!"! = 0.6 is a benchmark scenario; the difference between the varying scenario 
and the benchmark case is * significant at 5 %, ** significant at 1%, *** on the basis of the Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests 
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TABLE&2.9&&FIRM&INVESTMENT,&INTEREST&AND&EXIT&RATES&OBTAINED&FROM&SENSITIVITY&ANALYSIS:&!!"!! IS&VARYING&(!!"! = !.!,!!"! = !.!).$&
 0.9 1.0 
 Zero  
overconfidence 
Overconfidence Zero 
overconfidence 
Overconfidence 
 Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
Investment 50.80*** 13.89 18.09*** 3.25 51.80*** 14.39 25.19*** 8.62 
 
Interest rate 0.14107 0.00296 0.22124 0.00157 .14103** .00291 .22083**  .00171 
 
Exit rate 13.66*** 5.81 
 
22.23*** 2.32 13.86***   5.76 23.30*** 2.93 
Note: the scenario with !!"! = 0.6 and !!"!= 0.8 is a benchmark scenario; the difference between the 
varying scenario and the benchmark case is * significant at 5 %, ** significant at 1%, *** on the basis 
of the Wilcoxon signed rank tests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (
TABLE&2.10&FIRM&INVESTMENT&OBTAINED&FROM&SENSITIVITY&ANALYSIS:&THE&RISK&COEFFICIENT&IS&VARYING&&
Risk coefficient Zero overconfidence Overconfidence 
! Without CGS With  CGS Without CGS With  CGS 
 Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev 
0.5 47.89 12.40 49.65 13.22  11.7 1.23  13.81 1.33 
0.6 40.81*** 14.02 44.71*** 15.14 12.53*** 1.56 15.15*** 2.32 
0.7 34.43*** 14.52 37.53*** 15.98 12.53*** 1.56 14.02 2.29 
Note: the scenario with ! = 0.5 is a benchmark scenario; the difference between the varying scenario 
and the benchmark case is * significant at 5 %, ** significant at 1%, *** on the basis of the Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests 
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TABLE&2.11&FIRM&INTEREST&RATE&OBTAINED&FROM&SENSITIVITY&ANALYSIS:&THE&RISK&COEFFICIENT&IS&VARYING&
Risk 
coefficient 
Zero overconfidence Overconfidence 
! Without CGS With  CGS Without CGS With  CGS 
 Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev 
0.5  .14119  .00308  .14112 .00298   .22089 .00199 .22114 .00158 
0.6  .14130*** .00291 .14098   .00281 .22120 .00324 .22120 .00324 
0.7 .14153  .00314  .14128  .00317 .22030 .00315 .22117 .00299 
Note: the scenario with ! = 0.5 is a benchmark scenario; the difference between the varying scenario 
and the benchmark case is * significant at 5 %, ** significant at 1%, *** on the basis of the Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE&2.12&FIRM&EXIT&RATE&OBTAINED&FROM&SENSITIVITY&ANALYSIS:&&THE&RISK&COEFFICIENT&IS&VARYING&
Risk  
coefficient  
Zero overconfidence Overconfidence 
! Without CGS With  CGS Without CGS With  CGS 
 Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev 
0.5 13.29 6.02 13.51   5.83 19.87 2.84 20.81 2.24 
0.6    11.91*    5.85  11.67** 5.73    20.39 3.53  21.15    3.87 
0.7     10.7**    6.21  10.45***  6.30   20.39 3.53 21.15 3.42 
Note: the scenario with ! = 0.5 is a benchmark scenario; the difference between the varying scenario 
and the benchmark case is * significant at 5 %, ** significant at 1%, *** on the basis of the Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests 
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TABLE&2.13&FIRM&INVESTMENT&OBTAINED&FROM&SENSITIVITY&ANALYSIS:&THE&PARAMETER&;VARIABLE&COST&IS&VARYING&&
Variable 
cost 
parameter 
Zero overconfidence Overconfidence 
g Without CGS With  CGS Without CGS With  CGS 
 Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev 
1.0 58.44***  14.24 61.30*** 15.39 17.24*** 1.70 28.63*** 5.62 
1.1 47.89 12.40 49.65 13.22 11.7 1.23 13.81 1.33 
1.2 38.54*** 9.99 40.04*** 10.08   9.79 *** .97   9.74*** .95 
Note: the scenario with ! = 1.1 is a benchmark scenario; the difference between the varying scenario 
and the benchmark case is * significant at 5 %, ** significant at 1%, *** on the basis of the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE& 2.14& FIRM& INTEREST& RATE& OBTAINED& FROM& SENSITIVITY& ANALYSIS:& THE& PARAMETER& ;& VARIABLE& COST& IS&
VARYING&&
Variable 
cost 
parameter 
Zero overconfidence Overconfidence 
g Without CGS With  CGS Without CGS With  CGS 
 Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev 
1.0 .15460*** .00331 .15446*** .00317 .24401*** .00195 24426*** .00251 
1.1 .14119 .00308  .14112 .00298  .22089 .00199 .22114 .00158 
1.2 .13000*** .00281 .12992*** .00271 .20172*** .00186 .20185*** .00166 
Note: the scenario with ! = 1.1 is a benchmark scenario; the difference between the varying scenario 
and the benchmark case is * significant at 5 %, ** significant at 1%, *** on the basis of the Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests 
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TABLE&2.15&FIRM&EXIT&RATE&OBTAINED&FROM&SENSITIVITY&ANALYSIS:&&THE&PARAMETER&;&VARIABLE&COST&IS&VARYING&&
Variable cost 
parameter 
Zero overconfidence Overconfidence 
g Without CGS With  CGS Without CGS With  CGS 
 Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev 
1.0 14.48***  5.69 14.87*** 5.49 22.69*** 2.45 26.7*** 3.78 
1.1 13.29 6.02 13.51 5.83 19.87 2.84  20.81 2.24 
1.2 11.93*** 5.99 12.21** 5.81 18.60* 2.79 18.66*** 2.44 
Note: the scenario with ! = 1.1 is a benchmark scenario; the difference between the varying scenario 
and the benchmark case is * significant at 5 %, ** significant at 1%, *** on the basis of the Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests 
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Figure'2.1'Firm'investment'dynamics'without'overconfidence'(absolute'values)'(
 
 
 
 
 
Figure''2.2'Firm'interest'rate'dynamics'without'overconfidence''(
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Figure'2.3'Firm'exit'rate'dynamics'without'overconfidence''(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure'2.4'Firm'investment'dynamics'with'overconfidence'(absolute'values)'(
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Figure'2.5'Firm'interest'rate'dynamics'with'overconfidence'(
 
 
 
 
 
Figure'2.6'Firm'exit'rate'dynamics'with'overconfidence'(
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Figure'2.7'StartCups'investment'dynamics'without'overconfidence'(absolute'values)'(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure'2.8'Incumbents'investment'dynamics'without'overconfidence'(absolute'values)'
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Figure'2.9'StartCups'interest'rate'dynamics'without'overconfidence''(
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Figure'2.10'Incumbents'interest'rate'dynamics'without'overconfidence''(
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Figure'2.11'StartCups'exit'rates'without'overconfidence'(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure'2.12'Incumbents'exit'rates'without'overconfidence'
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Figure'2.13'StartCups'investment'dynamics'with'overconfidence'(absolute'values)'(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure'2.14'Incumbents'investment'dynamics'with'overconfidence'(absolute'values)'(
 
 
 (
0(2(
4(6(
8(10(
12(14(
16(
1( 5( 9( 13( 17( 21( 25( 29( 33( 37( 41( 45( 49( 53( 57( 61( 65( 69( 73( 77( 81( 85( 89( 93( 97(
Without(CGS(With(CGS(
0.00(
0.50(
1.00(
1.50(
2.00(
2.50(
3.00(
1( 5( 9( 13( 17( 21( 25( 29( 33( 37( 41( 45( 49( 53( 57( 61( 65( 69( 73( 77( 81( 85( 89( 93( 97(
Without(CGS(With(CGS(
( 45(
Figure'2.15'StartCups'interest'rate'dynamics'with'overconfidence''((
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure'2.16'Incumbents'interest'rate'dynamics'with'overconfidence''
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Figure'2.17'StartCups'exit'rates'with'overconfidence'(
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Figure'2.18'Incumbents'exit'rates'with'overconfidence'(
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Firms                                                                              Flow%Diagram            
 !! !!!!!
!! !!! !
!!!
Firms produce output !!" = !!!!!" !
Firms calculate current profits and net worth !!" = !!"! − !!!")!!" !!" = !!"!! + !!" 
 !
Firms calculate expected profits ! !!"  
depending on !!∗: !!"#∗ ≫ !! and !!"#∗ > !! ⟹ 
Max ! !!"  
 !
Firms decide the amount of ! !"!and investment !!" 
 
 !
!!"!  is defined !
!!"!! + !!" < 0! !!" = !!" − !!"!!"  is 
defined !
Yes!
Next period t+1 !
No!
Substitute by a new entrant !
Bank  !
Allocate credit !!!"! = !!!! !!"!!"!!!!!! + (1− !)!!! !!"!!!!!! !
Determine the equilibrium r!" 
from  !!!"! = !!!"! !!
Calculate !!!! = !!"!!"! − !![ 1− ! !!!! + !!!!]!∈! !!
Public authority 
Firm!age!!<!5!&!!!" > !!!
!!"! ! !!!"! :!!!"!>!!!"! ! !!"!=!!"! !
Yes! No!
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!
Chapter(III(
Competitive(strategies,(perceived(competition(and(firm(performance(
of(micro(firms:(the(case(of(Trento(!
3.1(Introduction(!
Competition plays a fundamental role in economics since it has a strong effect on firm 
behavior. Competition pushes firms to frequently undertake offensive and defensive actions that 
should result in their competitive advantage. Gatignon and Reibstein (1997) identified four possible 
reactions that might appear as a response to the threat of entry: retaliation, accommodation, ignoring, 
and abandonment.1Steenkamp et al. (2005) have found that while facing with promotion and 
advertising attacks of rivals the vast majority of firms in the short run prefer no reaction as a response.  
The authors also identified that among those firms that prefer to respond to the actions of rivals the 
most common response was to react in the same manner: to meet promotion attacks with promotions 
and the advertising attacks — with advertising. 
Empirical studies have found contradictory results of the effect of competition on innovation 
and firm performance. The Schumpeterian view that postulates that the relationship between 
competition and innovation is negative because competition diminishes the post-innovation rents 
resulting in reduction of firm incentives to innovate have been confirmed by many studies (Kamien 
and Schwartz, 1982 and Cohen and Levin, 1989). Aghion et al. (2005) have found that the relationship 
between competition and innovation has a nonlinear form of an inverted-U shape so that competition !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Retaliation means that firms take a decision to fight against their competitions, accommodation implies that firms choose 
to cooperate with others that will result in joint benefits for all players, ignoring means that firms decide not to react to the 
threat of competition, and abandonment is a total withdrawal from the market (see Gatignon and Reibstein,1997 and Kemp, 
R.G.M., and Hanemaaijer, J.J., 2004 for details). 
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induces incentives to innovative for neck-and-neck businesses but reduces them for technological 
laggards.  
The positive effect of competition on firm performance has been detected by several empirical 
studies. For example, Nickell (1996) has shown that that competition has a strong impact on 
productivity growth of U.K. companies. Januszewski, Koke, and Winter (2002), by using data on 
German manufacturing firms, have found that firms that experience higher productivity growth operate 
in markets with an intensive level of competition. On the other hand, Kacker (2009) has shown that 
competition has different effects on different enterprises: competition might be growth enhancing for 
low productivity growth firms and, at the same time, growth-reducing for high growth productivity 
ones.  
This contradiction in empirical studies might be explained by existing differences among 
individual and behavioral factors of firms. In particular, preferences for certain actions as a response to 
the threat of competition can be mainly explained by variation in individual and firm characteristics. 
The question on how individual characteristics of the founder affect entrepreneurial actions has been 
widely addressed in the literature on an ‘entrepreneurial imprinting effect’. The ‘entrepreneurial 
imprinting’ is defined as the firm endowment of human capital of the founder. For instance, Grilli, 
Jensen, and Murtinu (2013) have found that  ‘entrepreneurial imprinting’ mainly determined by 
founders’ specific pre-entry work experience has an effect on sales growth performance of Italian new-
technology based firms (NTBFs). Several studies have shown that an entrepreneurial imprinting effect 
exists among firms and influences each firm’s future path (Boeker, 1988; Milanov and Fernhaber, 
2009; DeTienne and Cardon, 2012; DeTienne, McKelvie, and Chandler, 2012). Mathias et al. (2014) 
have demonstrated that the different sources of imprint navigate the way entrepreneurs take 
entrepreneurial actions. Specifically, the authors have shown that intentions for certain career choices 
or an entrepreneurial activity imprinted on humans early in life have diverse effects not only on the 
decision to start a new venture but also on future actions and behavior of entrepreneurs.  
The effect of competition on firm behavior might significantly vary across firms of different 
size. Indeed, many findings related to competition and based on the sample of large firms and SMEs 
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cannot be reproduced when the sample of micro firms is used. Furthermore, lack of the data on micro 
firms and ignorance of the importance of micro firm research for a long-time result in a low number of 
studies investigating behavior of micro firms in the context of competition. 
Microenterprises play an important role in European economy since they account for 92.4 
percent of all European businesses and engage 29.9 percent of all employees (Eurostat - European 
Business, 20132). Apart from the fact that vast majority of businesses have less than ten employees 
(are micro), microenterprises can be also characterized as the most vulnerable kind of firms in terms of 
resources. In particular, these business units often suffer from an obligation on a business, stemming 
from EU legislation, that is on the other hand perfectly manageable for SMEs with larger number of 
employees (Federation of Small Businesses, 2011).   
Mettler and Williams (2011) claim that today the advantage of ‘being large’ does no longer 
exist. The technologies of the 21st century have created opportunities for microenterprises to operate in 
a more efficient manner avoiding the problems faced by large firms such as bureaucracy or 
overstaffing.  This implies that the role of microenterprises should be reconsidered.  The authors 
identified two main determinants of the rise of microenterprises — successful internalization and the 
Internet — that allow microenterprises to access to larger markets, make contracting faster and easier 
and, at the same time, to reduce substantially the contracting costs. 
There is compelling evidence that small and large businesses differ in the way they build and 
adopt their competitive strategies. Chen and Hambrick (1995) have studied how a competitive 
behavior of small firms differs from that of their larger counterparts. Their findings suggest that a 
competitive behavior of small firms differ substantially from that of larger units, so that the former are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!Methodical note: The figures presented in this paper are based on Eurostat’s structural business statistics (SBS) that 
provide data on the structure, conduct and performance of businesses across the European Union (EU) operating in 
industry, construction, trade and services. See Eurostat - Statistics Explained: Business economy - size class analysis (2013 
ed.).!Retrieved from December, 2, 2014 Statistics http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/ 
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more likely to initiate competitive moves while the latter are more likely to respond to attacks. In 
addition, the authors have indicated that small firms tend to implement competitive actions faster than 
large ones, whereas large firms prefer to announce their responses more quickly. Dean, Brown, and 
Bamford (1998) suggest that the existence of diverse impact by industry structure characteristics on 
large and small firms might be explained by their different endowments of the unique resources and 
capabilities. This raises the question of whether theoretical and empirical models and approaches 
specifically developed for larger business units are applicable on microenterprises. 
The objective of this study is to explore what strategies micro firms adopt when they are faced 
with different levels of competition. Competitive advantages of firms are defined on the basis of 
Porter’s (1980) model of generic strategies — differentiation and cost leadership. In addition, we 
introduce a third option that firms can choose and that is no action to competition or non-strategic 
behavior. Porter (1980) argues that firm’s competitive strategy is mainly aimed to serve as a tool, 
which protects the firm from competitive forces or translates them in its favor. Thus, identification of 
firm’s competitive strategies is essential for understanding the processes behind interactive behavior of 
firms as well as the outcomes of these processes. Similar to the theoretical framework of Block et al. 
(2015) we investigate what firm and entrepreneur characteristics affect the choice of a competitive 
strategy. Finally, we test whether the choice of certain strategy results in better firm performance 
measured by labor productivity growth. Since the effect of adopting a differentiation strategy might 
take longer time to occur, we add firm performance in 2011 to the performance in 2010 to control the 
long-term effect of differentiation.  
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3.2(Theoretical(background(!!
This section focuses on the previous literature on perceived competition, competitive strategies, 
and firm performance. Since one of the objectives of our study is to investigate how microenterprises 
react to different intensity of perceived competition, the section begins with discussion of perceived 
competition.  Section 3.2.1 is mainly based on the work of Kemp & Hanemaaijer (2004), where the 
authors made a review of the existing theories of competition paying attention to both approaches of 
competition, the economic and cognitive literature. In order to identify what strategies are followed by 
microenterprises and how the strategy choice is attributed to firm and individual characteristics, 
Section 3.2.2 follows partially the paper of Block et al. (2015) where the authors show that the choice 
between cost leadership and differentiation strategies of microenterprises depends on the start-ups 
entry strategies. Finally, the last Section 3.2.3 on the relationship between firm strategies and their 
performance is mainly based on the study of Gibcus and Kemp (2003), which reviews the current 
literature on the influence of firm strategies on small firm performance.  
 
3.2.1%Perceived%competition%
  
Kemp & Hanemaaijer (2004) emphasize the role of two streams of literature that are named as 
conventional approaches to the analysis of the role of competition in industries and markets – the 
structure–conduct–performance (SCP) paradigm that dominated in the industrial organization (IO) 
literature until the early 1980s and the strategic group notion from strategic management (Scherer and 
Ross, 1990). The main idea of SCP is that the structural characteristics of an industry (the number and 
size distribution of firms in an industry) determine the strategic behavior of firms (market conduct) 
necessary to interact with other firms, which in turn yield a specific performance (Slade, 2004).  The 
main critique of the SCP paradigm is based on the fact that this paradigm was not derived from the 
models of optimal decision making of economic agents (Slade, 2004). Moreover, the increased power 
of the game theory let the oligopoly models, which are based on the assumptions of the exogenous 
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conduct (e.g., Cournot or Bertrand behavior) and endogenous entry and firm performance, to be 
widely accepted.  
Leask and Parnell (2005) noted that the strategic group notion is often considered as a 
compromise between two levels of analysis: the industry level from the industrial organization (IO) 
literature and the organizational level of analysis from strategic management (Porter, 1981; Hergert, 
1983).  Hunt (1972) defined the strategic group as "A group of firms within an industry that are highly 
symmetric. . .with respect to cost structure, degree of product differentiation, degree of vertical 
integration, and the degree of product diversification... formal organization, control systems, and 
management rewards and punishments... (and) the personal views and preferences for various possible 
outcomes..." (p. 8).   
Further Porter (1977, 1980) developed the concept of the strategic groups and incorporated the 
notions of IO economics in the strategic management. More precisely, the mobility barrier theory 
developed by Caves and Porter (1977) emphasizes the role of mobility barriers that are very similar to 
the entry barriers but the difficulty of movement between neighboring market positions is caused by 
the joint activities of member firms of the strategic groups. The main advantage of the strategic group 
theory with respect to the SCP paradigm is that the former takes into account the performance 
variations within industries by splitting industries and moving closer to the firm level of analysis 
(Leask and Parnell, 2005).  
Kemp & Hanemaaijer (2004) argue that, in order to understand the competitive process 
entirely, it is, first, necessary to understand different directions, which can be considered as the main 
sources of competition. Among strategic researchers it is commonly accepted to use the Porter’s five 
forces model (1980) in order to determine the nature and degree of competition. The Porter’s model 
distinguishes five competitive forces: perceived threat from rivals, perceived threat from entrants, 
perceived threat from substitutes, perceived pressure from suppliers and perceived pressure from 
buyers. The main advantage of this framework is that competition is treated as a more complex process 
than just rivalry interaction with competitors. One of the five forces will be always able to capture the 
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essential issues in the division of value created by industry participants despite the ambiguity in the 
way of determining industry boundaries.  
 While conventional theories pay more attention to the outcomes of competition, the main 
focus of marketing and strategic literature is the process of competitive action. This kind of research 
that is usually carried out at firm level mainly concentrates on investigating the decision-making 
process of subjects who are involved in creation of firm competitive strategies.  Entrepreneurs play an 
important role in this framework because their perception of environment influences the decisions 
about their further actions. This implies that strategic management should also adopt a behavioral 
perspective; particularly, the main knowledge about how organizations and managers behave should 
be obtained from the empirical analysis. The bounded rationality challenged the previous assumptions 
of optimal decision-making and equilibrium and suggested to consider cognitive limitations of 
economic agents.  
The cognitive logic on competition is based on the well-known information-processing 
framework consisting of three sequential steps: the process of observing information, the following 
interpretation of obtained information and the reaction related to this perception (Kiesler and Sproull, 
1982; Daft and Weick, 1984).  As Kemp & Hanemaaijer (2004) have emphasized this information-
processing framework have been widely used in the strategic management and marketing literature 
(Chernatony and Daniels and Johnson, 1993; Clark and Montgomery, 1999; Waarts and Wierenga, 
2000).  
 
%!!!!!!!!!!!
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3.2.2%Competitive%strategy%!
Porter (1980) has identified three basic strategies adopted by firms “in order to create a 
defendable position against the five competitive forces” (Porter, 1980, p.29): overall cost leadership, 
differentiation, or focus. In order to cope with the threat of competition, firms need to make two 
choices: first, whether to pursue cost leadership or differentiation as a competitive strategy of firm and, 
second, whether to focus on one market segment, implying adopting the focus strategy, or to choose an 
industry-wide scope of activities. The overall cost leadership strategy is targeted towards price 
sensitive consumers and is achieved by having minimal costs of R&D, advertising, service, and sales 
management. Achieving a level of comparative costs lower than those of competitors results in higher 
average profitability even in the presence of strong competitive pressure.  
According to Porter (1980) a differentiation strategy implies that the uniqueness of goods and 
services offered by firm. Differentiation might be reached in numerous ways: the product design, 
technology, customer services, and a dealer network. It is reasonable to pursue this strategy in the 
existence of a necessity for specific products, in the presence of specific firm resources necessary for 
satisfaction of consumers’ needs, or in the absence of price sensibility by customers. Main challenges 
inherent in adopting a differentiation strategy are high costs of investments like investment in R&D or 
in product design.  
In microenterprises, which are often presented by solo-employees, the entrepreneur plays a 
crucial role since the functions of firm owner comprises not only firm management but also employee 
functions. Thus, human capital should have a strong affect on preferences of strategies adopted by 
microenterprises as well as on their performance. The amount of resource, defined as human capital, is 
determined by the amount of knowledge accumulated by individuals working in the microenterprise. 
According to Polanyi (1967), knowledge can be represented by two types: explicit and tacit. While the 
former refers to the ability to do something, the latter includes the knowledge of doing something.  
With respect to a cost leadership strategy, differentiation requires substantially more firm and 
individual resources because it allows firms to obtain sustained competitive advantage. For example, 
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the explicit and tacit knowledge accumulated by the firm is hardly imitable by its competitors at least 
in the short time-period. Thus, human capital can be attributed to a differentiation strategy. Riley 
(2011) argues that since differentiation implies offering products with unique characteristics that are 
probably more technologically advanced than those of competitors following another strategies, its 
adoption requires the increase of personal knowledge in conducting business analysis as well as 
specific knowledge and skills necessary to produce unique products.  
Furthermore, since human capital is attributed to a differentiation strategy, it is reasonable to 
expect that this strategy is more likely to be adopted by better-educated and more experienced 
entrepreneurs. For example, Block et al. (2015) have found that a differentiation strategy is less likely 
to be adopted by necessity self-employed than other start-ups and these preferences can be partially 
explained by existing differences in human capital between two groups: necessity entrepreneurs are 
characterized by lower level of educational attainment and lack of entrepreneurial experience. 
Davidsson and Honig (2003) suggest that an entrepreneurial activity requires the interaction of both, 
explicit and tacit, knowledge. This implies that the amount of human capital can be increased by a 
means of formal and non-formal education, where the latter includes training courses and experience 
related either to the past entrepreneurial activity or to the previous labor market position. 
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3.2.3%Firm%performance%%!
Gibcus and Kemp (2003) emphasize that in the literature on strategic management (Porter, 
1991) the degree of firm success is conditioned by three factors: first, an internally consistent set of 
goals and functional policies need to be defined and realized, second, this set of goals and policies 
should link properly strong and weak points of the firm with the external opportunities and threats and, 
third, the unique strengths that can give a company a competitive advantage have to be created and 
exploited. These three conditions ensure strategy consistency and good firm performance.  
Gibcus and Kemp (2003) argue that the firm size and the environment might affect the strategy 
that leads to better performance. Adopting one of competitive strategies might result in its sustained 
competitive advantage if the chosen strategy is based on the resources that have been defined by 
Barney (1991) as valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and sustainable. The entrepreneurial-type 
activities implying strong creative and marketing abilities, and product-coordination skills are more 
likely to be linked with differentiation than cost-leadership. Firms that perform these types of activities 
are often small in size. Adopting a differentiation strategy is more favorable for SMEs since it is more 
likely to result in better firm performance of SMEs (Dean, Brown, and Bamford, 1998; Pelham, 1999; 
Gibcus and Kemp, 2003). The authors claim that cost leadership is a less suitable strategy for SMEs 
since it has a strong link with large-scale production.  
Based on the previous findings of the management theory of small firms, Pelham (1999) 
maintains the view that a cost leadership strategy is often not feasible for small firms due to their 
limited resources. Thus, a differentiation strategy should have stronger influence on performance of 
small firms (Walker and Ruekert, 1987 and Pelham, 1999). Overall, recent literature investigating the 
relationship between firm performance and the firm size in the context of strategic responses suggest 
that small and large businesses possess different advantages associated with their firm size that 
translate into various strategic moves made by small and large firms. In particular, for small firms it is 
easier to adapt to quick changes in the environment as well as to meet specific market demands while 
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for their larger counterparts it is easier to establish lower costs and bargain with their suppliers or 
customers (Khosla and Sawhney, 2014).  
Competitive strategies have been modified in many studies applying Poter’s typology to make 
them applicable to SMEs (Gibcus and Kemp, 2003). For instance, Dess and Davis (1984) categorized 
firms into four groups similar to Poter’s generic strategies and compared firm performance among 
these groups. The authors have found that firm performance varies among four groups. Their results 
suggest that the effect of a certain strategy depends on a choice for applied measure for firm 
performance. Specifically, the best firm performance measured by return on total assets are realized by 
a group adopting a cost leadership strategy while the highest sales growth are achieved by firms 
following a focus strategy.  
Pelham (1999) argues that adoption of generic strategy by small manufacturing firms has weak 
influence on firm performance whereas the level of market orientation affects it strongly. The author 
explains these findings by the fact that a market-oriented culture is a stronger source of sustainable 
competitive advantage for small firms than generic strategy adoption. “Market orientation is a resource 
that is imperfectly imitable because of Barney’s (1991) condition of social complexity requiring social 
engineering that may be beyond the capabilities of many firms” (Pelham, 1999, p.35). 
Gibcus and Kemp (2003) have empirically questioned whether adopting one of generic 
strategies influences firm performance measured in various ways. Based on the data on Dutch SMEs, 
firm strategies have been distinguished into two groups, differentiation and cost leadership, while the 
former strategy has been further categorized in innovation, marketing, service, and process 
differentiation. Their analysis has shown that competitive strategies operationalized in that way do not 
influence neither an objective nor a subjective measure of firm performance. Gibcus and Kemp (2003) 
have concluded that their results are quite similar to those found by D’Amboise (1993), Pelham 
(2000), Teach and Schwartz (2000), Spanos and Lioukas (2001), and Kemp and Verhoeven (2002).  
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3.3.(Data(and(measures(
%
This study is based on the unique dataset of microenterprises that has been collected by 
Statistical office of Trento, Italy. This dataset is specifically targeted to microenterprises operating in 
the Province of Trento, Italy. Panel members are supposed to be microenterprises if the number of 
employees engaged in the firm is less than ten. The vast majority of micro firms presented in this panel 
are locally oriented. This feature of microenterprises is typical for the province implying the difficulty 
of generalization of findings based on these data to the entire population of microenterprises. 
The data come from the ‘general entrepreneurs’ questionnaire’ survey, which was conducted 
with the owners of microenterprises. The dataset is composed from three waves collected in 2010, 
2011, and 2013 respectively. The first wave refers to firms’ situation on December 31, 2009 and 
includes 2134 firms, the second – on December 31, 2010 and includes 1895 firms and the third one – 
on December 31, 2012, which includes 1544 firms.  The dataset has a structure of panel data and 
includes information about firms’ general characteristics, firms’ structure, labor force, strategic 
dynamics, firms’ financial situation, and individual entrepreneurs’ characteristics.   
In addition, the data on firm value added and a number of employees in 2011 and 2010 were 
obtained from the regional Tax Agency3 and Statistical Register of Active Enterprises (ASIA) 
respectively. The data on value added collected by the Tax Agency include smaller number of 
observations because firms that are solo-entrepreneurs are not obliged to declare these outcomes in the 
tax-paying documentations.  
Panel data often suffer from the panel attrition problem. That is the process of dropout of 
individuals interviewed in the first wave from subsequent waves. In our case, panel attrition is mainly 
caused by exit of microenterprises. This is especially true for the database used in this study since the 
last waves refer to the situation of micro firms affected by the crisis. The exit rate of microenterprises 
has increased dramatically in 2012. Since submission of the questionnaire was mandatory for 
microenterprises, the probability that micro firms’ owners refused to reply to the questionnaire is very 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3!The name of the Tax Agency in Italian is “Agenzia delle Entrate”.!
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low. This suggests that the response rate of the survey is high resulting in low chances of sampling 
bias. 
The microenterprises are mainly presented in wholesale and retail trade (25%), construction 
(24%), and services (22%) and less in manufacturing (8%), other services (8%), metallurgy (7%) and 
transport (6%).  The majority of firms (about 60%) are solo-entrepreneurs. The dataset does not 
include any start-ups and consists mainly from very old firms. The majority of entrepreneurs are 
males. Many owners have a previous work-paid experience but much less have the entrepreneurial 
experience. Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the main firm and entrepreneur 
characteristics.  
[insert Table 3.1 here] 
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Variables%and%measurement%!
Dependent variables 
 
Given the way how we operationalize generic strategies, the primary choice of revealed 
competitive strategy is based on four options: to follow cost leadership, to follow differentiation, to 
adopt a mixed strategy, or to decide not to take any action to competition. Table 3.2 presents the 
descriptive statistics of micro firms’ preferences of the possible competitive strategies. As it can be 
seen from Table 3.2, there are very few firms that combine cost leadership and differentiation 
strategies. Thus, we exclude the analysis of a mixed strategy from our focus. The variable that proxies 
a cost leadership strategy is obtained from the survey questionnaire data on microenterprises. Firms’ 
owners were asked about the relative importance of having costs lower than those of competitors. A 
micro firm strategy is deemed to be cost leadership if the fact that offering prices lower than those of 
competitors is considered to be very important for the owner. The differentiation strategy includes 
three investment categories of micro firms: investment in R&D, marketing and advertising, and 
training. By our definition micro firms follow a differentiation strategy if they invest at least in one of 
the three types of investment.  
[insert Table 3.2 here] 
 
One of the principal data limitations inherent in this line of research is lack of balance sheet 
information necessary to explore firms’ investment behavior and their financial situation. Since micro 
firms are not required to present all relevant financial information in the balance sheets, this kind of 
data limitations is not just a specific problem of our data source but it is a major issue for all data 
focusing on microenterprises. Thus, the only possible information related to firm investment is 
obtained from the survey questionnaire. Table 3.3 reports a number of firms that made investment in 
2009, as well as a number of firms invested in five types if investment: investment in machinery, in 
land and buildings, in training, in marketing and advertising, and in innovation during the same period 
of time.  
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[insert Table 3.3 here] 
 
The choice of investment types deemed as a differentiation strategy is explained by the fact that 
all three of them are caused by competitive forces. Indeed, investment in R&D is innovation driven, 
while investment in training and investment in marketing and advertising are human capital and 
positioning driven respectively. We exclude from our analysis firm investment in machinery and 
investment in land and buildings because they are not appropriate for our approach: micro firm 
investment in land and buildings is more related to the long-term orientation and is not competition 
driven while investment in machinery requires additional information on the amount of investment and 
its nature in order to consider it as a competitive strategy.  
 Firm performance is proxied by labor productivity growth (used in logarithms), which is 
operationalized by value added per employee4. Block et al. (2015) argue that some types of strategies 
can be more beneficial for long-term performance than others. Following this line of reasoning, it is 
possible to expect that the effect of following a differentiation strategy needs to take longer time to 
occur. For this reason we used firm performance in 2010 and 2011 as outcome variables. Table 3.4 
shows the summary statistics of the outcome variable. 
[insert Table 3.4 here] 
 
Key independent variables 
 
 
Since this study aims to identify what kind of strategies competition pushes micro firms to 
follow, one of the key independent variables in our study is a self-reported measure of the intensity of 
competition. The subjective measure of competition is based on the survey questionnaire data on 
microenterprises. Firms’ owners were asked about the intensity of competition and their responses 
were allocated to the three-point scale including “strong”, “weak”, and “no completion”.  This variable 
provides information on perception of intensity of competition by micro firms’ owners. As can be seen !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Because of data limitations firm performance can be measured only by labor productivity growth and cannot be enriched 
by other firm performance measures.  
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from Table 3.5, for the 77,5 percent of micro firms the competition is perceived to be strong. The 
information about firms’ perceptions of competition is referred to the year 2009. 
 
[insert Table 3.5 here] 
 
Control variables  
Based on the previous empirical and theoretical studies aimed to investigate main determinants 
of the strategy choice (for example, Block et al., 2015), we added a number of firm and entrepreneur 
level control variables. As firm level control variables, the following firm characteristics were used in 
the model: firm age in years, firm size in number of employees, being a family firm or not, and having 
a business partner or not. Since the number of firms with more than four employees (5%) is very 
small, firms have only been distinguished by solo employees and employee firms. As for entrepreneur 
level control variables, the following entrepreneur characteristics were included in the model: 
entrepreneur’s gender, age in years, and entrepreneur level of education. We also included in the 
regression information about entrepreneur previous labor market position and entrepreneurial 
experience as well as general experience in the sector (years in the sector). In addition, we included 
start-up motivations in the model that are divided into three groups: entrepreneurial spirit, continuing a 
family tradition, and substituting a wage job.  
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3.4(Research(design(!
Our empirical design is twofold. In order to test how perceived competition and firm characteristics 
are associated with micro firm strategies in 2009, we first estimated a multinomial logistic regression 
model (3.1): Pr !! = ! = !"#!(!!!!)!"#!(!!!!)!!                     (3.1) 
where,!Pr !! = !  is the probability of choosing alternative j as competitive strategy, !! !is a vector of 
explanatory variables and !! !are the coefficients, which are estimated using maximum likelihood 
estimation. The base category is non-strategic action !! = 0 ,!and the alternatives are cost leadership 
strategy !! = 1  and differentiation strategy !! = 2 . 
Second, to check whether the preference for a certain strategy leads to better performance, we 
estimated an OLS regression with lagged independent variables (3.2). !!"!! = !! + !!!!" + !!!"#$%"&'!" + !!    (3.2) 
where, !!"!! is labor productivity growth measured as ∆!" !"#$%!!""#"!"#$ ! !for the years 2010 (t+1) and 
2011(t+2) respectively and !!" is a vector of independent variables: preferred strategies, firm and 
owner characteristics referring to the year 2009. !! and !!!are the coefficients to be estimated and !!              
is the firm level error term. Several control variables referred referring to the year 2009 are included in 
the model.  
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3.5(Multivariate(regression(results(!!
Table 3.6 shows how perceived threat of competition affects firm preferences for competitive 
strategies.  
[insert Table 3.6 here]  
 
Results presented in Table 3.6 suggest that when microenterprises perceive competition as strong they 
prefer to response to the threat of competition by adopting either differentiation or cost leadership 
strategies. By contrast, when competition is perceived to be weak micro firms prefer to follow only a 
differentiation strategy. These results partially support previous findings suggesting that small firms 
are often precluded from adopting a cost leadership strategy because of their resource limitations and 
impossibility to enjoy the benefits of economy of scale.  
As regards firm characteristics, we find that firms operating in wholesale and retail trade are 
more likely to follow a cost leadership strategy than firms in services while a differentiation strategy is 
less preferable for micro firms operating in construction, manufacturing, and transport than for those in 
wholesale and retail trade. We find strong evidence that the probability to adopt a differentiation 
strategy is higher for microenterprises with employees than for solo-employees.  
Several individual characteristics play an important role in determining the choice of micro 
firms’ strategies. For instance, it is more likely that the firm follows a differentiation strategy when 
younger entrepreneur manages the firm. As for a cost leadership strategy, being managed by male 
owners is also a good predictor of adopting this kind of strategy. Finally, human capital measured by 
formal education and entrepreneurial experience has a strong effect on micro firms’ strategy 
preferences. Highly educated entrepreneurs prefer to adopt a differentiation strategy compared to those 
with a low level of education. Previous entrepreneurial experience is positively associated with a 
preference for adopting a differentiation strategy but negatively with revealed cost leadership. As we 
expected, there is no statistically significant effect of an entrepreneur’s previous labor market position 
on strategy preferences. 
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[insert Table 3.7 here] 
The next question that has been addressed in this study is how preferences for certain strategies 
of micro firms are associated with their performance. Table 3.7 shows the OLS estimates of micro 
firms’ strategies on labor productivity growth in 2010 and 2011 respectively. Our results suggest that 
there is no significant relationship between the choice of competitive strategy and labor productivity 
growth either in 2010 or in 2011.  
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3.6(Robustness(checks(
 
As robustness checks the simultaneous equations (3.1-3.2) are estimated using the three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) procedure, which allows endogeneity of both probability of choosing a certain 
strategy and firm performance. Table 3.8 shows the 3SLS estimates of micro firms’ strategies on labor 
productivity growth in 2010 and 2011 respectively. The results of the 3SLS estimation confirm our 
previous findings: there is no a significant relationship between the choice of competitive strategy and 
labor productivity growth either in 2010 and 2011 respectively.   !
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3.7(Conclusion(and(discussion(!
Many studies have used the classification of competitive strategies developed by Porter (1980). 
Current literature on the relationship between the firm size and the preference for a certain strategic 
behavior suggest that small firms tend to adopt a differentiation strategy more frequently. This is 
mainly explained by the fact that small firms are limited in the available recourses. Instead, the 
economies of scale, that can enjoy only large firms, may allow them to keep low costs. Our results 
partially support this evidence: while micro firms that perceive competition as strong tend to follow 
both strategies, those businesses that perceive competition as weak prefer to adopt only a 
differentiation strategy.  
Overall, the results of our analysis suggest that perceived threat of competition pushes firms to 
take actions. The preferences for actions are explained by available resources. In particular, the 
preference for a differentiation strategy is determined by human capital and the age of entrepreneur, so 
that this kind of action is more likely to be taken by younger entrepreneurs with higher level of 
education and previous entrepreneurial experience. At the same time, the existence of previous 
entrepreneurial experience is negatively associated with the probability to choose a cost leadership 
strategy.  
While previous studies on strategic behavior of small firms argue that small firms adopting 
differentiation theoretically should have better performance (Walker and Ruekert, 1987 and Pelham, 
1999), empirical evidence only barely confirms these results. By contrast, many studies on small firms 
have found that competitive strategies do not affect firm performance (D’Amboise, 1993; Gibcus and 
Kemp, 2000; Teach and Schwartz, 2000; Spanos and Lioukas, 2001; Kemp and Verhoeven, 2002). 
Our results confirm this empirical evidence. We did not find any statistically significant effect of a 
preference for a certain competitive strategy on firm performance although micro firms with various 
firm and individual characteristics have different preferences for a competitive strategy.   
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Limitations and future research 
Even though we use a high quality data set with features that allow us to specifically address 
the problem for micro firms, it still has some limitations. While not within the scope of our study (as 
we assessed the effect on labor productivity growth and thus required a longer time-frame and reliable 
performance data), start-ups operating in the province were not included in our data. Future research 
could address this caveat as the literature clearly indicates that generic strategies are extremely 
common among start-ups (Carter et al., 1994; Block et al. 2015). 
Second, our data only allowed for short-term assessment of how generic strategies affect firm 
performance. In line with the conclusions of Leitner and Güldenberg (2010) a longer time frame, 
preferably ten years or longer, is necessary to properly assess the long term effects of a consistent 
generic strategy. Perhaps, a longer time frame can also help to uncover performance differences 
between different generic strategies. Especially since it can be argued that for micro firms 
differentiation may achieve higher returns than cost-efficiency in the long run, as there is are 
limitations to the amount of labor cost reduction and the period of lowered wages. 
Finally, our data lacks the possibility to properly investigate firm performance of companies 
that implement a combination of both generic strategies As other studies point at the potential of this 
ambidextrous approach (Burke, van Stel, and Thurik, 2009; Leitner and Güldenberg, 2010), future 
research could address this gap by adapting the theory of blue and red ocean strategies to the context 
of micro firms (Kim and Mauborgne, 2005). It is emphasized that while competing in red oceans 
implies following either cost leadership or differentiation, creating blue oceans requires the 
combination of both generic strategies.  
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Appendix(B(
 
 
TABLE!3.1!MAIN!FIRM!AND!FIRM!OWNER!CHARACTERISTICS!!
Variables (2009) Freq. Percent. 
Sectors:   
Wholesale and retail trade 538 25 
Construction 515 24 
Services 645 30 
Manufacturing 177 8 
Metallurgy 133 7 
Transport 126 6 
   
Firm size in 2009:   
0 employees 1,433 67 
1 employee 274 13 
2 employees 153 7 
3-5 employees 226 11 
6-12 employees 48 2 
   
Family firm 1,155 54 
   
Female 386 18 
   
Having a business partner 574 27 
 
  Higher educational level 1,015 48
   
Entrepreneurial experience 610 29 
 
  Previously employed 1,693 79
   
Total number of observations 2,134 100 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
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TABLE!3.2!PREFERRED!FIRM!STRATEGIES!
 
 
Freq. Percent 
   Zero action 1,236 57.92
Combined 89 4.17 
Cost leadership 243 11.39 
Differentiation 566 26.52 
   Total 2,134 100.00 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
 
 
 
TABLE!3.3!FIRM!INVESTMENT!IN!2009!
 
Investment Freq. Percent Cum. 
 
Machinery 
 
No 
 
1,393 65.28 65.28 
Yes 
 
741 34.72 100.00 
Total 
 
2,134 100.00 
 
     Training 
 
     No 
 
1,721 80.65 80.65 
Yes 
 
413 19.35 100.00 
Total 
 
2,134 100.00 
 
     Land and buildings 
     No 
 
2,081 97.52 97.52 
Yes 
 
53 2.48 100.00 
Total 
 
2,134 100.00 
 
     Marketing and advertising 
     No 
 
1,764 82.66 82.66 
Yes 
 
370 17.34 100.00 
Total 
 
2,134 100.00 
 
     Innovation 
     No 
 
2,065 96.77 96.77 
Yes 
 
69 3.23 100.00 
Total 
 
2,134 
      
100.00 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
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TABLE!3.4!IN</DECREASES!IN!LABOR!PRODUCTIVITY!IN!2011!AND!IN!2010!(IN!LOGARITHMS)!
 
    
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2011 1229 .0225813 .5545582 -4.44054 3.915.891 
2010 1237 .0059577 .6081319 -9.859.013 489.144 
 Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
 
 
 
 !
 
 
 
TABLE!3.5!DESCRIPTIVE!STATISTICS:!PERCEIVED!INTENSITY!OF!COMPETITION!
 
…competition Freq. Percent 
   
No  185 8.67 
Weak 295 13.82 
Strong 1654 77.51 
   
Total 2,134 100.00 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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TABLE!3.6!DETERMINANTS!OF!PREFERRED!COMPETITIVE!STRATEGY!!
Variables 
Non-strategic 
behavior Cost leadership Differentiation 
 
Strong competition 0.000 0.768** 1.061*** 
 
(.) (2.573) (3.902) 
Weak competition 0.000 0.204 0.897*** 
 
(.) (0.563) (2.995) 
No competition ref. 
 
Wholesale and retail trade ref. 
 
Construction 0.000 -0.331 -0.482*** 
 
(.) (-1.602) (-2.871) 
Manufacturing 0.000 -0.346 -0.430* 
 
(.) (-1.202) (-1.949) 
Metallurgy 0.000 0.296 -0.157 
 
(.) (1.035) (-0.640) 
Services 0.000 -0.690*** 0.099 
 
(.) (-2.971) (0.635) 
Transport 0.000 0.017 -0.892*** 
 
(.) (0.058) (-3.026) 
Firm age 0.000 -0.007 0.003 
 
(.) (-0.827) (0.579) 
Owner's age 0.000 -0.008 -0.044*** 
 
(.) (-0.779) (-5.165) 
Family firm 0.000 -0.072 0.001 
 
(.) (-0.434) (0.009) 
High level of education 0.000 -0.020 0.384*** 
 
(.) (-0.120) (3.163) 
Motive: Entrepreneurial spirit ref. 
 
Motive: Continuing family 
tradition 0.000 0.153 0.048 
 
(.) (0.677) (0.287) 
Motive: Substituting a wage job 0.000 0.141 -0.063 
 
(.) (0.776) (-0.474) 
Entrepreneurial experience 0.000 -0.485*** 0.226* 
 
(.) (-2.649) (1.814) 
Previous labor market position 0.000 0.032 0.180 
 
(.) (0.166) (1.294) 
Years in the sector 0.000 0.009 0.008 
 
(.) (0.929) (0.973) 
Having employees 0.000 -0.004 1.023*** 
 
(.) (-0.025) (8.737) 
Business partner 0.000 0.088 0.065 
 
(.) (0.471) (0.470) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is the preferred strategy in 2009. The estimation model is Mlogit, z-statistics in parentheses. All control variables refer to 
the year 2009.  
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
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TABLE!3.7!MICRO!FIRMS’!STRATEGIES!AND!FIRM!PERFORMANCE!IN!2010,!2011!
Variables 
Firm performance 
 2010 
Firm performance 
2011 
Non-strategic behavior 
 
ref. 
 
Cost leadership 0.020 -0.066 
 
(0.366) (-1.052) 
Differentiation -0.025 -0.008 
 
(-0.642) (-0.229) 
Wholesale and retail trade 
 
ref. 
 
Construction 0.047 -0.015 
 
(1.000) (-0.372) 
Manufacturing 0.067 0.080 
 
(1.205) (1.362) 
Metallurgy 0.060 0.021 
 
(0.868) (0.290) 
Services -0.068 -0.044 
 
(-1.440) (-0.938) 
Transport -0.026 -0.063 
 
(-0.392) (-0.951) 
Firm age -0.002** 0.001 
 
(-1.967) (1.257) 
Owner's age 0.000 -0.004** 
 
(0.021) (-2.461) 
Family firm 0.005 0.033 
 
(0.125) (0.986) 
High level of education 0.034 -0.042 
 
(1.066) (-1.290) 
Motive: Entrepreneurial spirit 
 
ref. 
Motive: Continuing family tradition -0.006 -0.047 
 
(-0.136) (-0.941) 
Motive: Substituting a wage job -0.026 0.021 
 
(-0.579) (0.502) 
Entrepreneurial experience -0.001 -0.060 
 
(-0.037) (-1.489) 
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TABLE!3.7!(CONTINUED)!MICRO!FIRMS’!STRATEGIES!AND!FIRM!PERFORMANCE!IN!2010,!2011(
  Previous labor market position 0.074 0.044 
 
(1.199) (0.953) 
Having employees -0.005 0.183*** 
 
(-0.122) (5.118) 
Business partner -0.040 -0.005 
 
(-1.096) (-0.131) 
Female -0.021 0.045 
 
(-0.344) (1.043) 
Constant 0.035 0.081 
 
(0.272) (0.696) 
Observations 1,181 1,169 
R-squared 0.014 0.051 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is firm performance in 2010 and 2011; measured by labour productivity in-/decreases in 2010 and 2011 respectively (in 
logarithms). Labour productivity growth is operationalized by value added per employee. The estimation model is OLS and robust t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. All control variables refer to the year 2009.  
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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TABLE!3.8!MICRO!FIRMS’!STRATEGIES!AND!FIRM!PERFORMANCE!IN!2010,!2011<!3SLS!ESTIMATES!!
Variables 
Firm performance 
 2010 
Firm performance 
2011 
Non-strategic behavior 
 
ref. 
 
Cost leadership -0.771 0.115 
 
(0.781) (0.!567) 
Differentiation -0.004 -0.!351 
 
(0.335) (0.287) 
Wholesale and retail trade 
 
ref. 
 
Construction 0.022* -0.039 
 
(0.054) (0.486) 
Manufacturing 0.050*  0.060* 
 
(0.061) (0.064) 
Metallurgy 0.093* -0.002* 
 
(0.077) (0.080) 
Services -0.122* -0.021* 
 
(0.067) (-0.063) 
Transport 0.001* -0.120* 
 
(0.087) (-0.085) 
Firm age -0.003***  0.002** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Owner's age 0.001*** -0.007** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) 
Family firm -0.002**  0.029** 
 
(0.036) (0.035) 
High level of education 0.017** -0.015** 
 
(0.050) (0.043) 
Motive: Entrepreneurial spirit 
 
ref. 
Motive: Continuing family tradition   0.007** -0.042 
 
 (0.046)  (0.50) 
Motive: Substituting a wage job -0.011** 0.014** 
 
(0.050) (0.045) 
Entrepreneurial experience -0.046* -0.030* 
 
(0.065) (0.059) !!!
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TABLE!3.8!(CONTINUED)!MICRO!FIRMS’!STRATEGIES!AND!FIRM!PERFORMANCE!IN!2010,!2011!<!3SLS!ESTIMATES(
  Previous labor market position 0.073* 0.057** 
 
(0.064) (0.050) 
Having employees -0.056 0.256 * 
 
(0.085) (0.066) 
Business partner -0.030 -0.003 
 
(0.036) (0.037) 
Female 0.061 -0.058 
 
(0.076) (0.052) 
Constant 0.077 0.331 
 
(0.237) (0.191) 
Observations 1,181 1,169 
R-squared 0.015 0.051 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable is firm performance in 2010 and 2011; measured by labour productivity in-/decreases in 2010 and 2011 respectively (in 
logarithms). Labour productivity growth is operationalized by value added per employee. The estimation model is 3SLS and robust standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. All control variables refer to the year 2009.  
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento !!! !!
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(
Chapter(IV(
Counterfactual(Impact(Evaluation(of(Investment(Subsidies:(MicroLlevel(
Evidence(from(Trento(
4.1(Introduction((
!!
The European Union and national government have tried to support enterprises by 
implementing different incentive programs. These programs have pursued a number of objectives such 
as improvement of growth and employment conditions, promotion of research and innovation, 
development of labor markets, and stimulation of investment activity. Policy analysis should be 
considered from two prospective: social benefits of subsidies and their costs. Sometimes the costs of 
incentives exceed their benefits, while result to wasting government financial resources. Bartik (2005) 
suggests that government subsidies can be wasteful for two reasons: local policymakers often 
overestimate the benefits of incentives, or the local disputes over incentives are often dominated by 
business interests. On the other hand, he argues that subsidies can be successful when firms become 
more responsive to incentive schemes as they become increasingly independent, or when increased 
local employment provides social benefits. 
In the literature on industrial policy the deep crisis of Italian industry is mainly explained by 
four factors: first, a predominance of micro and small firms, second, the specialization in traditional 
sectors of economic activity, third, a predominance of family ownership as an ownership structure of 
Italian firms, and fourth, the weakness of environment like presence of corruption or weak public 
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administration (Balloni and Iacobucci, 20045). With respect to the micro size of firms, creating policies 
targeted towards this group might comprise many obstacles.  
Microenterprises play an important role in the Italian economy on the regional and national 
levels since they represent the vast majority of all Italian firms. In contrast to the stereotype that 
entrepreneurship is a driver of economic growth, this type of firm in many cases does not fit well with 
a conventional image of entrepreneurship (Hytti, 2005). Many of them are not motivated to grow and 
some of them, especially independent professionals, are very close to low-income ranges, (Kautonen 
and Palmroos, 2010). Microenterprises quite often make low investments in productivity-enhancing 
technologies, specialize in low-technology products, target their production only towards local markets 
and, thus, keep constant firm size and performance for a very long time-period. On the other hand, 
small firms are considered to be the most vulnerable group that often suffers from financial constraints 
since the private investor may evaluate the financing risks to be higher than the expected returns of 
firm investment. There are at least two main rationales for providing capital grants to firms: presence 
of financial constraints and belief that capital investment is essential for productivity growth.  
The capital grant is a widespread measure that usually aims to stimulate firms’ investment 
activity mainly because of a common belief that firm investment can improve firm growth and 
profitability. De Long and Summers (1991) have shown that those countries that made high equipment 
investment grew extremely rapidly after the Second World War. This causal relationship was present 
even after controlling for whether high investment was induced by high savings or by a low relative 
equipment price.  
Bergstrom (2000) claims that the main rationale for granting capital subsidies to firms is that it 
can affect productivity that is important for long-term growth. The author suggests that subsidization 
can have a positive influence on productivity mainly because of two reasons: subsidies can help to 
improve technological development of firms or they can help the firms to utilize economies of scale in 
a more effective way. Nevertheless, policy implementation is a challenging task for policy makers that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See Bianchi, Labory, and Pontarollo (2010) for more discussions on industrial policy issues in Italy in the last 30 years.  
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includes many obstacles. Pack and Saggi (2006) argue that the information required for “proper” 
implementation of the policy is extraordinary and policy makers “have to understand the relevance of, 
and be accurately informed about, a huge range of complex questions and have the ability to accurately 
evaluate very subtle differences” (p.28). 
Hence, it does not come as a surprise that the empirical evidence on capital grants is 
controversial. For example, the Italian government has implemented several national programs 
specifically targeted to reinforce firm investment activity, such as, the incentives under Law 488/1992 
and Law 388/2000 aimed to increase firm capital investment. Besides the fact that the first two 
programs were successful in increasing firm capital investment in general, these incentives were 
unsuccessful in reinforcing additional investment meaning that the program did not push firms to make 
investment that would not have been possible to make without incentives (D’Aurizio and De Blasio, 
2008). 
The debates on the necessity of capital grants raise the question of why this kind of incentives 
can result in government failures and wasting of public money. First, the industrial policy scheme 
should be based on well-designed selection that is aimed to solve obvious and ambiguous market 
failures (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). Second, the policy effectiveness might be hampered by firm 
learning so that receiving public subsidies can be pursued as a goal by granted firms. If the public 
authority does not impose any restrictions on the amount of possible subsidy requests granted firms 
could learn how constantly to obtain subsidies. The latter issue is also important for evaluation 
purposes. Specifically, the results of the evaluation exercise of government intervention might be 
biased if the opportunistic behavior of firm is not taken into account. 
A wide variety of incentive programs and their award procedures is a result of government 
attempts to improve the effectiveness of industrial policies. In order to develop policy design, an 
accurate evaluation of existing support programs should be undertaken. The impact evaluation of 
industrial policies raises many methodological challenges. Because it is impossible to create the same 
conditions that would have existed without government intervention, approaches need to be adopted to 
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give an approximate idea of what would have happened. More precisely, we need to compare groups 
of participants and non-participants and to identify the causal effect of the program on the outcomes, 
controlling for other determining factors of the outcome (Trivellato, 2009). 
The number of studies that try to solve difficulties in policy evaluation has increased in the last 
decade and provided researchers with statistical methods that might be developed to concrete policy 
design. Besides the methodological issues in policy evaluation, data that include information 
concerning subsidies given to firms, main firm characteristics and firm performance are necessary.  
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of incentives on micro firms’ 
investment activities and their performance in the Province of Trento, Italy and to define what 
behavioral aspects can influence the likelihood of enrolling in the program. This paper addresses 
several questions by exploring a firm-level dataset. First, we determine whether the capital subsidies 
have a positive effect on firm propensity to invest in the years after policy implementation. Second, we 
evaluate the effectiveness of the policy in increasing the number of employees and improving firm 
performance. Third, by using self-assessed impact survey we test the additionality of investment, that 
is, whether investment financed by the subsidies would still have been carried out in the absence of 
government incentives. Fourth, we investigate how the owners of Trentino microenterprises evaluate 
the impact of the subsidies obtained on their investment activity, turnover and the number of 
employees. Finally, we compare the results derived from applying the econometrics approach to policy 
evaluation with estimates obtained from using self-assessed impact survey.  
This study makes several contributions. First, our study is based on the population of micro 
firms that differ from their larger counterparts and often do not fit well with a conventional image of 
entrepreneurship. Second, our identification strategy revealed what behavioral features can make 
treated and non-treated groups to be different besides conventional characteristics commonly applied 
in similar studies. The policy design gave a chance to the existence of firm learning on how to receive 
subsidies due to the lack of restrictions imposed on the amount of possible subsidy requests and fixed 
eligibility criteria. Specifically, subsidized and non-subsidized firms differ in the amount of pre-
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treatment applications for subsidy made before. Our third contribution is methodological. Since 
subsidized and non-subsidized firms are not fully comparable, the propensity score matching is not 
applicable on the total sample of firms. Thus, we restrict our analysis only to the subpopulation of 
micro firms belonging to the so-called common support and apply OLS estimation with the same set of 
controls included in the Propensity Score.  
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4.2(Literature(review(!!
The literature on evaluating the impact of industrial policies aims to identify a causal effect of 
government intervention on the performance of participating firms. Most studies investigate the direct 
effect of public subsidies on firms’ performance. For example, many researchers have evaluated 
changes in terms of the number of employees, sales, average productivity, and investment. Some 
studies have found evidence that subsidies increase investment in firms (Bondonio and Greenbaum, 
2006; Criscuolo, 2012). Others have concluded that the effect of subsidies on productivity is negligible 
or even negative (Harris and Trainor, 2005).     
In the literature on impact evaluation, the direct effect of industrial policy has been investigated 
by comparing the performance of subsidized and unsubsidized firms. Since these groups have not been 
chosen randomly, it is a challenge for researchers to create a proper control group.  If a control group 
is created in such a way that there are systematic differences between participants and non-
participants, the results will be unreliable (Martini et al, 2006). These systematic differences may 
appear for two reasons: the external changes influencing program participants 
and selection   bias   (Bartik   and  Bingham,  1995). The first issue implies that some global changes 
happening in the world may affect policy outcomes. Selection bias occurs due to either self-selection 
by firms when the total group of eligible firms cannot be determined or authority selection arises from 
the fact that grants are available only for applications that meet selection criteria (Blanes and Busom, 
2004).  
In order to obtain reliable results, counterfactual analysis should be carried out by 
implementing proper evaluation techniques. One of the most investigated industrial policies in Italy 
has been the support program under Law 488/1992 that provides opportunities for researchers to 
develop methods and techniques of counterfactual analysis. For example, a non-parametric approach 
for the continuous treatment case implemented by Adorno, Bernini, and Pelligrini (2007) is based on 
the two-step matching method. As a first step, they matched treated and non-treated firms on the basis 
of a set of observable characteristics, and then as a second step, among previously matched firms, they 
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implemented the matching procedure for firms with the same treatment levels. The main advantage of 
this approach is the possibility to control firms’ pre-intervention characteristics, which might be 
similar in one process but might differ in another.  
There is a lack of studies on industrial policy evaluation that are focused on the continuous 
treatment case. The vast majority of such studies do not take into account the presence of 
heterogeneity among units and among treatment doses of treatment (Adorno, Bernini, and Pelligrini, 
2007).  Overall, the question of programme heterogeneity has been addressed by Imbens (2000), 
Lechner (2001), Hirano and Imbens (2004), and Imai and Van Dyk (2004). Imbens (2000) and 
Lechner (2001) have extended the PSM approach for estimation of average treatment effects with 
multiple discrete treatments, while Hirano and Imbens (2004) and Imai and Van Dyk (2004) have 
implemented the Generalized Propensity Score (GPS) approach for the continuous treatment.  
Cerqua and Pelligrini (2011) have developed another statistical technique in evaluating the 
impact of subsidies provided by Law 488. Groups of treated firms were selected by exploring a 
mechanism of ranking and were divided according to their location in a particular territory. Each group 
had its own threshold and only firms with a score below this threshold in the same ranking group 
would be deemed an appropriate counterfactual. The regression discontinuity design was implemented 
in each ranking and the different estimates from the first step were integrated by a weighted structure, 
which was based on the proportion of treated units in each ranking.  
Recent studies on evaluating the impact of public subsidies aimed to support firms often apply 
the non-parametric technique, Propensity Score Matching (PSM). For example, Duch, Montolio, and 
Mediavilla (2007) evaluated the impact of regional policies targeted to support Catalan firms (Spain) 
and found that the growth rate of value added in post-treatment period is higher for those firms that 
received subsidies. Gabriele et al. (2006) also implemented the PSM in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the regional subsidies in the Italian province of Trento and found that the subsidies 
were only effective in fostering investment activity and increasing labor productivity in the short run 
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but not in the long run. The authors challenge whether the investments of subsidized firms were 
optimal and argue that the subsidies led to anticipation of investments.  
Subsidization of firms may cause a significant substitution effect. Criscuolo et al. (2012) 
propose that the substitution effect may appear within and between firms. It occurs “within” due to: 
time substitution (firms start projects that they would pursue in the future even without subsidies); 
substitution between plants (if some plants are located in an eligible area and others are not); and 
substitution between production procedures (instead of exploiting the most cost-effective procedure, 
firms might change the combination of capital and labor to maximize the likelihood of obtaining the 
subsidy). The last effect may appear between firms located in the same area (the advantages of 
investment would be taken by non-subsidized firms without government subsidies) or located in 
different areas (the development of eligible area may be achieved by decreasing growth of non-eligible 
one). 
More recent empirical studies have evaluated an indirect effect that is more prevalent in local 
areas and sectors.  For example, stimulation of some firms to invest might change behavior of 
untreated firms by biasing estimation results (Lee, 1996; Harris and Trainor, 2005).  Bergstrom (2000) 
examined a long-run effect of subsidies on productivity of Swedish firms and found little evidence that 
the subsidies affected productivity positively. Furthermore, investment incentives can influence the 
price of capital in the short run. Goolsbee (1998) has shown that the price of capital increased 
immediately after providing firms with investment incentives, especially in low-competitive industries.  
The results obtained in this study do not support the necessity of investment tax policy. The evaluation 
of an indirect effect is complex because it requires capturing a lot of assumptions concerning market 
characteristics and can only be applied if the results from micro level analysis are positive (Venetoklis, 
2002).  
The evaluation of government subsidies at the micro level might be improved by considering 
not only the benefits but also the costs of subsidies.  Bondonio (2012) evaluated the impact of large 
subsidies provided under Law 488 and small subsidies to SMEs in Piemonte. The impact was 
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measured by the difference between the average growth in employment, sales and investment observed 
between recipient and non-recipient firms by implementing counterfactual analysis. Additionally, 
Bondonio (2012) evaluated costs of achieving such results by exploiting information on the actual 
amount of subsidy.   
Returning back to the literature on the evaluation of direct or indirect effects, it is worth 
mentioning that these studies focus only on the impact of government incentives on firms’ behavior 
and on regional growth. Before investigating such issue the deadweight ― the degree to which 
investment projects are implemented ― might be also taken into account (Lenihan, 2004).  If the 
investment project would not be undertaken without subsidies then the deadweight is equal to zero. 
Tokila, Haapanen, and Ritsila (2008) showed that in Finland the probability of implementing 
investment projects without government incentives varies significantly between different types of 
investment projects.  The results differ between regions and between old and new firms. The 
difference between old and new firms may be explained by different access to finance for old and new 
firms.  
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4.3(Methodology(and(Results(!!
This section focuses on methodological issues of impact evaluation of industrial policies. Since 
the decision about a choice of methods depends on the characteristics of the data, the section begins 
with a description of the dataset. Section 4.3.1 describes the policy design (the description of the 
Law6/99). Section 4.3.2 provides information on source of the data and explains the choice of the 
time-period for policy evaluation. Section 4.3.3 examines aspects of policy evaluation and provides 
five methods for analyzing non-experimental data. Section 4.3.4 explains identification and estimation 
strategies as well as the self-assigned results from the survey on microenterprises. Section 4.3.5 
concludes and discusses future policy implications.   
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4.3.1(Design(of(“Law(6/99”((!
The main aim of the subsidies under Law 6/99 is to stimulate an investment activity of 
microenterprises operating in the Province of Trento. In this study we consider only fixed investment 
that includes investment in land and buildings, plants, machinery, equipment, infrastructure, and 
purchasing of patents. The support program was implemented in the form of a capital grant, which was 
given directly to microenterprises in one or several installments based on documentation provided by 
microenterprises. The amount of installments depends on the amount of investment made by firms as 
well its duration. The support program under Law 6/99 was conferred with the evaluation procedure 
implying that all decisions on the subsidies were based on the evaluation of investment projects of 
eligible firms by the public authority.  
The eligible units were enterprises, consortium of companies, institutions and associations 
that were registered at the Chamber of Commerce and were not declaring bankruptcy. The eligibility 
rule also required beneficiaries to operate in such sectors as industry, retail trade, handicraft, and 
tourism. Enterprises operating in the province of Trento were exposed to the intervention according to 
the following criteria: the eligibility of firms in terms of the sector of activity and residence, the 
adequacy of the expected expenses for each investment (considering the administrative and technical 
aspects of investments), the importance of investment for the firm from an economical and financial 
point of view, the relevance of the amount of the subsidy request to firm size and performance. The 
misbehavior of firms was limited by the program design so that subsidized firms were not allowed to 
sell the “object of the investment” for the period of 3-10 years.6 In the case of the violation of the 
program rule these firms could be obliged to return to the public authority the amount of subsidy 
received.  !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!The duration of the controlled time-periods depends on each particular situation.!
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4.3.2(Data((
 
The empirical research has been implemented using the dataset that includes information on 
industrial and service firms operating in the province of Trento for the period 2007-2012. The main 
interest of investigation is whether or not firms benefit from the subsidies obtained in 2009 and 2010. 
During these two years 229 microenterprises received the public incentives under the evaluation 
procedure and 204 of them responded to the survey (the response rate is 89%). The term ‘public 
incentives’ includes direct subsidies under unique Law 6/99 provided by the public agency of Trento 
in the form of direct payments. In order to estimate the ATT, a control group made up 1544 
microenterprises was used.  
This study is based on the unique and rich dataset of microenterprises specifically targeted to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the subsidies given to microenterprises in Trento and to investigate their 
behavior. The data come from four different sources: the survey on microenterprises, the regional Tax 
Agency,7 the APIAE database, and the archives from the Statistical Register of Active Enterprises 
(ASIA). The ‘general entrepreneurs’ questionnaire’ survey on microenterprises was collected by the 
Statistical Office of Trento, Italy.  The information used to perform matching procedure was mainly 
obtained from the survey of microenterprises that includes data on firm and entrepreneur 
characteristics such as age of the firm and the entrepreneur, sectors of economic activities, number of 
owners, motives for business establishment, and firm financial resources. 
The survey on microenterprises includes two groups of firms: treated and non-treated. The 
survey on treated microenterprises represents the whole population of firms that benefited from the 
support program under Law 6/99 that was conferred with the evaluation procedure in 2009 or in 2010. 
It includes the same type of information as the survey on non-treated firms. The survey on non-
subsidized firms is a representative sample of the population of micro firms operating in the Province 
of Trento.8  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7!The name of the Tax Agency in Italian is “Agenzia delle Entrate”.!
8 For more information on the survey on non-treated firms, see Chapter 3.  
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 The data from the regional Tax Agency contain information on sales revenue, production 
costs, and value added derived from the IRAP and the IVA declarations referring to years 2007-2011. 
The archives from ASIA contain information on the number of employees, which refers to a time-
period from 2007 to 2011. The APIAE9 database contains all information relevant to the process of 
subsidy requests that firms made during the period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010. For 
instance, it includes administrative data on the number of subsidy requests, the date of making a 
request and obtaining the subsidy, and the procedure under which firms received the grants.  
The survey on microenterprises contains a section in which firms indicate how their investment 
activities would have been carried on in the absence of the incentives and the self-evaluated effect of 
receiving subsidies on their performance. In order to perform the counterfactual analysis, firms in the 
control group were also asked to indicate what they would have done if they had received the 
treatment. Given the information from this questionnaire, the research analysis is expanded to 
comparing the results obtained from the impact evaluation of industrial policies with the results 
obtained from the questionnaire.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 APIAE is the provincial agency that is in charge of managing the granting process. !
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4.3.3(Approaches(to(policy(evaluation(!
Firms’ subsidization aims at increasing several outcomes such as investment, employment, and 
productivity. In order to conclude that a change in a firm’s behavior was due to policy intervention, it 
is necessary to know how a firm would perform without receiving such support. The problem emerges 
from the impossibility to observe a single firm in both conditions at the same point of time. This issue 
was named by Holland (1986) as the fundamental problem of causal inference. A process of impact 
evaluation requires distinguishing treated and non-treated units for further comparison.  
The Roy-Rubin Model (Roy 1951, Rubin 1974) is a framework for an empirical analysis of 
causal inference. This model has been expanded for a pair of potential outcomes allowing for general 
heterogeneity in the effects of the treatment. The model consists of the following components: 
individual firms, treatment, and potential outcomes (responses).   A treatment status is defined by 
binary indicator D, showing whether actually firm i received a subsidy or not. !! = 1!!"!!"#$!!!!"#"$%"&!!"#!$%&0!!"ℎ!"#$%!!  
Each firm is characterized by a value of potential outcomes (Y1;Y0), where Y1 refers to  the outcome the 
firm would experience in case it took part into the program while Y 0 is the outcome the same firm 
would experience at the same time in case it did not take part into the program. In order to complete 
the model specification, a set of exogenous covariates X=(x1, x2,…, xk) ― firm characteristics 
unaffected by the treatment ―is introduced.  
The treatment effect for each firm i can be defined as the difference between its potential 
outcomes:                                ∆!! = !!! − !!! .                                 (4.1) 
The fundamental problem of causal inference mentioned above can be described by using 
mathematical notation. The observed outcome for each individual is given by  !! = !!! !! − (1− !!)!!!.                   (4.2) 
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The potential outcome Y1 for a firm that participated in the program is observed and the potential 
outcome Y 0 for a firm that did not participate is observed, but both outcomes cannot be observed for a 
specific firm at the same point in time, resulting in the impossibility of evaluating the causal effect 
(4.2). In cases when Y1is observable, then the unobservable Y 0 is called counterfactual. The other way 
around when it is Y 0 to be observable. 
Because of this causal problem, evaluation procedures should concentrate on the population 
averages of impacts from treatment. In the literature, the two most investigated treatment effects are 
the average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).  The first 
effect, ATE, which is the expected causal effect for the population, is given by ∆!!"# = ! ∆! = ! !! − ! !! .            (4.3) 
Researchers have concentrated more on evaluating the average effect on the treated that 
characterizes the average effect over a subpopulation of treated units. ATT can only account units that 
participated in the program and is given by  
        ∆!!"" = ! ∆!|! = 1 = ! !!|! = 1 − ! Y!|D = 1 .   (4.4) 
In order to obtain unbiased estimation results by contrasting participants to on participants, it must be 
that ! !! ! = 1 = !(!!|! = 0),                   (4.5) 
that is, the counterfactual expected outcome of treated must be equal to the factual expected outcome 
of non-treated. This assumption usually holds only in randomized field trials. With non-experimental 
data, this identifying assumption very often fails, thus resulting in selection bias, which arises when 
treated and non-treated firms operate differently even without receiving subsidies.  
Depending on data available for researchers, the selection bias problem can be tackled by 
applying several statistical methods. Each method, described below, is based on assumptions. These 
methods can be divided into two groups: matching and the regression discontinuity design (RDD) that 
are based on the selection on observables assumption, and the difference-in-differences approach and 
instrumental variables (IV) that are based on the selection on unobservables assumption.  
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Matching technique  
A control group in matching is built by picking units that have the same observable 
characteristics as treated ones. The matching estimator (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997) is based 
on the assumption that treated and non-treated units are equivalent with respect to potential outcomes 
after conditioning on observable variables. This assumption is called the Conditional Independence 
Assumption (CIA) and is given by !!!!,!! ⊥ !|! .                                 (4.6) 
If this condition holds then to estimate the impact of program participation a direct comparison of 
treated and non-treated units can be implemented because the only difference in outcomes existing 
between firms is due to program intervention.  
An additional condition needed to apply the matching technique requires observing both groups 
―treated and non-treated ― at each possible value of the observable characteristics. This is named 
Common Support condition and is given by 0 < ! ! = 1 ! < 1.                        (4.7) 
      The advantage of the matching technique is that it can be combined with other methods of 
impact evaluation, for instance with the difference-in-differences approach. In this case, units are first 
matched on the base of their observable characteristics and then the effect of subsidies is estimated by 
implementing the difference-in-differences approach. The joint use of the two methods is more likely 
to provide a valid estimate. However, a direct application of simple matching may cause some 
difficulties. For instance, matching treated units with non-treated might be too complicated if the 
number of characteristics is large.  
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Matching with propensity score   
The most accepted technique for matching treated and non-treated firms is based on calculation 
of the so called propensity score p(x): ! ! = !(!! = 1|!!).                       (4.8) 
A propensity score is an indicator, which represents the probability of being assigned to a 
particular treatment based on characteristics that can predict such an assignment. It was introduced by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), who showed that if CIA holds conditioning on x then it holds 
conditioning  on p(x):  !!,!! ⊥ !|! ! .                               (4.9) 
Using a probability model allows us to include many characteristics that affect the assignment process. 
After estimating a score for each unit of treated group, a subgroup of controlled units that have a 
similar propensity score can be identified.  
Matching on the propensity score can be implemented in several ways that differ mainly in 
three aspects: the definition of the neighborhood for each treated unit, the assignment of weights to 
these neighbors and the way of handling the common support problem (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
There are five main matching algorithms used in PSM estimation: Nearest Neighbor (NN), Caliper and 
Radius, Stratification and Interval, Kernel and Local Linear, Weighting (see Becker and Ichino (2002), 
or Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for the detailed description).  
Regression discontinuity design 
This technique was first introduced by Thistlethwaite and Cambell (1960) and can be 
implemented when the eligibility for a program is determined by whether an “assignment” variable 
goes beyond a cut-off point. One of the advantages of the RDD is that in the neighborhood of the 
threshold, the RDD presents some characteristics of a pure experiment. A limitation of this approach is 
that the mean impact can only be estimated at the threshold for selection. In the case of heterogeneous 
treatment effects, any conclusion about an impact on units away from the threshold for selection 
cannot be obtained. In this situation, only a local mean impact of the treatment can be identified.  
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The Difference-in-differences estimator 
This approach requires longitudinal or repeated cross-sectional data both on participants and on 
nonparticipants for at least two time periods. Computation of a double difference produces estimates of 
impacts that are more credible than those based on a single difference. First, the difference in average 
outcomes in both treated and control groups before and after treatment is calculated. Then evaluation 
is carried out by comparing the difference before and after treatment in a control group with the 
difference in a treated group (Ashenfelter, 1978; Ashenfelter & Card, 1985): ∆Y!"! = Y!"! − Y!"! D = 1 − Y!"! − Y!"! D = 0 .   (4.10) 
The advantage of the difference-in-differences estimator (DID) is that it does not require 
complex data structures. In order to apply the DID, observations on policy outcome before and after 
the intervention are needed. A limitation of the DID is a crucial assumption required for its 
implementation: the parallel trend assumption that claims that the counterfactual trend for treated is the 
same as the factual one for non-treated firms. In order to test this claim, more pre-intervention 
outcome data are necessary.  
Instrumental variables  
Instrumental variables (IV) can be implemented in the presence of characteristics that influence 
participation decision but do not have direct impact on the outcome variables. The IV approach has 
similarities with randomized experiments (Heckman, 1997). An additional variable can be used as an 
instrumental variable if it satisfies two requirements: this variable should be strongly correlated with 
the decision rule (treatment variable) and it must not have a direct effect on, nor be correlated to, the 
outcome variable.  A limitation of the IV approach is the complexity of finding a credible instrument.  
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4.3.4(Identification(and(Estimation(strategy((!
Matching%on%the%propensity%score%!
The dataset consists of 204 treated firms and 1544 non-treated firms. In order to create a valid 
control group, the main characteristics that determine the probability to be granted a public subsidy 
must be identified. The choice of variables refers to the exiting literature in the field of industrial 
policy evaluation and to the information available from the dataset. Characteristics of treated and non-
treated firms that were included to test the potential influence on receiving the subsidies are presented 
in Table 4.1. As can be seen from Table 4.1, the pre-treatment characteristics were not balanced 
between two groups before implementing matching on the propensity score (PS).    
 As for structural characteristics that can affect the probability to receive subsidies it is common 
to control for firm size and sectors of economic activity. Since our study is based on the population of 
micro firms, the variation in firm size measured by the number of employees is small. Nevertheless, 
the number of employees should be included in the model because this variable describes the amount 
of resources available for microenterprises and determines firm productivity. As firm level control 
variables, the following firm characteristics were used in the model: firm age in years, being a family 
firm or not, and having a business partner or not. Variables that describe whether the microenterprise 
belongs to a group of family firms and whether multiple owners manage it are included in the analysis 
because both of them define the amount of available resources like financial recourses, physical and 
human capital.  
As for entrepreneur level control variables, the following entrepreneur characteristics were 
included in the model: entrepreneur’s gender, age in years, and start-up motivations. Firm and 
entrepreneur age are important because they often determine the program eligibility. The start-up 
motivation describes why entrepreneurs chose to be self-employed and includes three categories: an 
entrepreneurial spirit, continuing a family tradition, and substituting a wage job. This variable was 
selected on the basis of related literature on entrepreneurship. Block et al. (2015) argue that start-up 
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motivations tend to be lasting ones. This implies that they can navigate the way entrepreneurs take 
different actions and affect each firm’s future path. 
One of the main arguments in favor of government intervention is the presence of credit 
constraints that can act as a barrier for firm investment. Credit constraints may determine the 
probability to be granted a subsidy mainly because of the following reasons: first, firms may prefer to 
seek additional funds in the public sector because it is more difficult to obtain them from the private 
one and, second, public incentives are targeted towards a group of firms for which certain activities are 
not feasible due to existing financial constraint (Duch, Montolio, and Mediavilla, 2007). Two 
variables, being a client of several banks and being a client of the Cassa Rurale bank, were used as 
proxies for credit constraints. Being a client of several banks describes whether the firm is a client of 
single or multiple banks. Given that our data do not include any start-ups, we expect that being a client 
of a single bank means that this bank has more information about its borrowers. Hence, the firm that 
has long-lasting ties with a single bank is less credit constrained. The Cassa Rurale bank is the leading 
cooperative credit bank in Trento that aims to help its clients and members to achieve mutual 
objectives. This implies that those firms that are clients of the Cassa Rurale bank might be less 
financial constraints.  
Since the subsidies under Law 6/99 have been granted over an extensive period of time, it 
might be the case that the difference between treated and control groups exists because firms that 
received the subsidies in 2009 or 2010 have learnt much better how to ask subsidies in the previous 
decade. In order to control for this possible source of imbalance between two groups, we included in 
the model the number of pre-treatment subsidy requests made throughout the period from January 1st, 
2000 to December 31st, 2008 as a control variable. The choice of the time-interval is explained by the 
fact that during this time-period the design of Law 6/99 has remained unchanged. Micro firms that 
have higher values of the number of pre-treatment subsidy requests would be deemed as units that 
have better knowledge on how to receive the subsidies than those that have lower values.  
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  We performed propensity score matching with a kernel-based method. The results of the 
logistic regression estimation used to calculate the propensity scores are presented in Table 4.2. The 
dependent variable in the logistic regression model is a dummy variable for the receipt of the subsidy 
either in 2009 or in 2010. The explanatory variables included in the logistic regression model refer to 
year 2009 except the variables that define the dynamics of firm size and firm performance. These 
explanatory variables referring to years 2007 and 2008 are proxied by the number of employees, firm 
value added, firm revenues, and firm labor productivity respectively. 
The validity of the matching estimator crucially rests on the assumption that treated and non-
treated groups are similar in terms of unobservable characteristics, which can both affect participation 
decision and the outcome of the program. Gertler et al. (2011) suggest that in order to perform 
verification and falsification tests for the matching estimator, three conditions must be checked: first, it 
is necessary to justify that there are no unobservable variables relevant for program participation and 
correlated to the outcome; second, it is necessary to perform the balance tests, that is, to check whether 
the observed characteristics between treated and control groups are well balanced; third, it is necessary 
to check whether the common support assumption is satisfied. 
 The first condition on the absence of unobservable variables that determine program 
participation and are correlated to the outcome is not testable directly, for this reason, it is necessary to 
explore the relevant theory in order to understand whether such unobservable variables might exist. 
We make this condition less severe by controlling for the time-constant unobserved effects that might 
bias the evaluation results. This approach requires additional information on the outcome variables 
measured in the pre-intervention period. For this reason, we used outcome variables that refer to years 
2007 and 2008 as covariates. In order to test whether the distributions of covariates between treated 
and control groups are equal we implemented a balancing test. Table 4.3 shows the results of a balance 
test for the vast majority of covariates between treated and control groups.  
Since the average causal effect can be estimated only within the region of common support, it 
is important to test the overlap and the region of common support (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 
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1999 and Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). In particular, it is necessary to verify that any combinations 
of characteristics observed among treated units can be also observed among controls (Bryson, Dorsett, 
and Purdon, 2002 and Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). For a visual analysis of the common support the 
density distribution of PS that is shown in Figure 4.1 and the PS histogram by treatment status that is 
shown in Figure 4.2 were used. As can be seen from both figures, the overlap is narrow for those firms 
that have the propensity score greater than 0.25. This implies that all business units with estimated 
propensity scores outside the interval (0, 0.25] need to be disregarded since there is no comparison unit 
comparable to them. Hence, the average causal effect can be estimated only for the subpopulation of 
microenterprises with estimated propensity scores less or equal to 0.25.  
As discussed above, one of the potential sources of imbalance between groups might appear 
because of the differences in a number of pre-treatment subsidy requests between treated and control 
groups. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of the number of pre-treatment subsidy requests in treated 
and control groups. As it can be seen, two groups differ in the number of subsidy requests made from 
January 1st, 2000 to December 31st, 2008. This implies that treated and controls firms are not fully 
comparable. Our finding that treated firm have learnt better how to receive subsidies under Law 6/99 
identifies the source of selection bias.  
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Estimation of ATT for observations with p-score less or equal to 0.25 
 
The next step after testing and analyzing the differences in pre-intervention observable 
characteristics among treated and non-treated firms is estimation of the average treatment effect on the 
treated. Several firm characteristics were used as outcome variables to estimate treatment effects: 
whether or not firms invested in 2012, whether or not firms invested in physical capital in 2012, 
whether or not firms invested in human capital or marketing and advertising in 201210, the number of 
employees in 2011, firm revenues in 2011, value added in 2011, and labor productivity in 2011.  
The outcome variables related to firm investment are dummies. One of the principal data 
limitations inherent in the research on microenterprises is lack of balance sheet information necessary 
to explore firms’ investment behavior and their financial situation. Since microenterprises are not 
required to present all relevant financial information in the balance sheets, this kind of data limitations 
is not just a specific problem of our data sources and research but it is a major problem for studies 
focusing on microenterprises. Thus, the only possible information related to firm investment is 
obtained from the survey questionnaire.  
As for firm investment, the data include information on whether the firm has invested or not in 
2012 as well as information on whether the firm has invested in 2012 in each of the following types of 
investment - investment in machinery, in land and buildings, in training, in marketing and advertising, 
and in innovation. Since for some types of investment the number of observations is small, we 
differentiated investment categories into two groups: investment in physical and non-physical capital 
in 2010. The former includes investment in machinery, land and buildings, and in innovation, while 
the latter contains investment in training and in marketing and advertising. Investment in physical 
capital confides with one of the principal investment categories targeted by the support program under 
Law 6/99, while investment in training and in marketing and advertising is excluded from the target 
group of the policy.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10!For convenience investment in human capital and investment in training were called as investment in non-physical 
capital.!!
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As discussed above, the ATT can be estimated only for the subpopulation of firms with the 
PS values less or equal to 0.25. Formally, we need to estimate the treatment effect with the following 
regression: !! = ! + !!!! + !!!!"!!!! + !! ,              (4.11) 
 
where !!  is a vector of the outcomes, !!  is the treatment status of the firm i 
(!! = 1!!"#!!"#$!#%!!"#$%,!"#! ! =0, otherwise), !!" is a set of K  baseline covariates of the firm i 
(the set of covariates is the same with the one that was used for the PS matching), !! is the error term. 
 Table 4.4 reports the regression estimates of the treatment effect on the treated for the 
subpopulation of firms. The only significant result we found is a positive impact of the program on the 
propensity to invest in training or in marketing and advertising in 2012. These types of investment 
differ from those targeted by the program under Law 6/99 because one of the main objectives of the 
policy was to foster investment in fixed capital. These results can be interpreted twofold: first, firms 
pursue as a goal making compliment investment and second, they prefer to invest in training and in 
marketing and advertising but partially finance this kind of investment by a means of public funds. The 
former explanation implies that the positive outcome of investment can be obtained if investment in 
physical capital is complimented by investment in non-physical assets such as marketing and 
advertising or investment in training. On the other hand, granted firms can pursue as a goal making 
investment in training and in marketing and advertising but partially finance this type of investment by 
a means of saved internal resources. This might be the case if they substitute depreciated capital by 
new fixed capital subsidized by the public authority. Nevertheless, these hypotheses cannot be tested 
because of the lack of the data on firm performance in 2012 and 2013 as well as more detailed 
information on firm investment.  
With respect to other outcome variables, we did not find any significant effects of granting 
subsidies to microenterprises.  
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Estimation of ATT for observations with p-score less than one 
In order to assess how our results are sensitive to the limited overlap problem we estimate the 
ATT for the total sample of units. Table 4.5 shows the regression estimates of the effect of granting 
subsidies to micro firms in 2009 or 2010 with the same set of covariates controlled for in the PS 
matching. Similar to the previously found effect of the program for the subpopulation of firms, our 
results suggest that subsidized firms are more likely to invest in training and in marketing and 
advertising in 2012 than non-subsidized. However, the coefficient for the probability to make non-
physical investment in 2012 for the total population is larger than those for the subpopulation (with the 
estimated propensity scores less or equal than 0.25). Furthermore, when we do not restrict our sample 
only for those units that have strong overlap the coefficient for firm revenues in 2011 turn out to be 
positive and statistically significant. This result indicates that the estimates for the total sample suffer 
from a substantial bias.   
 
Comparing the econometrics results with the self-assessed results from the survey on 
microenterprises 
In addition, the research analysis is expanded to comparing the results obtained from the impact 
evaluation of the public subsidies in Trento under Law 6/99 with the results obtained from the self-
assessed impact survey on microenterprises. This survey is based on the questionnaire, which includes 
information on firms’ subjective evaluation of the impact of the subsidies that they obtained in 2009 
and in 2010. The structure of the questionnaire is similar to the one presented in the Bank of Italy’s 
BIRD system’s Surveys (Banca d’Italia, Survey of Industrial and Service Firms, 2005). Our analysis of 
the self-assessed impact survey is based on the work of Cannari, D'Aurizio, and De Blasio (2006), 
where the authors used the Bank of Italy’ BIRD Survey in order to investigate the effect of subsidies 
given to Italian manufacturing firms. The analysis of the effectiveness of subsidies has been carried 
out by exploring information on firms’ subjective evaluation of the incentives.  
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The survey was conducted by the Statistical Office of Trento in 2013 on the sample of 2291 
entrepreneurs.11 The respondents are the microfirms’ owners. Because of the micro size of firms, the 
owner of the firm is the sole manager and strategist at the same time, meaning that the owner plays the 
main role in firm’s decision-making process. This is essential condition for the reliable subjective 
evaluation since it ensures that the respondents of the questionnaire are those who have the direct 
responsibility for the firm’s decisions (Cannari, D'Aurizio, and De Blasio, 2006). The results of the 
survey on the self-assessed impact of the policy are based on 204 subsidized firms and on 1349 non-
subsidized firms.  
First, we restrict our analysis of the self-assessed impact of the program to a group of treated 
firms. Table 4.6 shows the main sources of information on the program: merely 45 percent of 
subsidized firms knew about contributions from their business consultant, while 36 percent and 13 
percent of beneficiaries received this information from their sectoral association and the APIAE 
information materials respectively. The vast majority of beneficiaries was quite confident that they 
would receive subsidies while applying for them. The results shown in Table 4.7 suggest that only 6 
percent of respondents believed that the probability to be granted was small, while 20 percent of 
subsidized firms were certain that they would be subsidized.   
           Micro firms that received subsidies under Law6/99 have been asked whether the policy led the 
beneficiaries to invest more. Table 4.8 reports the respondents’ answers. The vast majority of firms, 72 
percent of the respondents, believed that the subsidies under Law6/99 push firms to invest more.  
As regards the main motives for asking subsidies, only 47 percent of respondents participated 
in the program due to the lack of internal recourses, while all others have enough internal funds to 
make investment (see Table 4.9). This survey finding indicates that the program failed to allocate 
subsidies efficiently among micro firms. Probably, the selection rule should also take into account that 
monitoring of firms and their investment projects needs to reveal financially constrained participants.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!11!The complete questionnaires in Italian are available from the Statistical office of Trento or IRVAPP (Istituto per la 
Ricerca Valutativa sulle Politiche Pubbliche ) upon request. !
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A similar finding emerges from the next question. In order to understand how firms that 
benefited from the program would invest in the absence of the public finance, the following 
counterfactual question has been formulated:  
         “Without incentives under Law 6/99, your firm would have made: 
1) the same amount of investments in the same projects 
2) the same amount of investments in projects at least partly different 
3) a smaller amount if investments 
4) no investment at all” 
The answers to this question are presented in Table 4.10. Approximately half of beneficiaries would 
have made the same amount of investments in the same projects without incentives under Law 6/99. 
This suggests that for the majority of subsidized firms the program was not successful in reinforcing 
additional investment. As can be seen from Table 4.10, the program has pushed only 28 percent of 
subsidized firms to make some extra investment, while 13 percent of beneficiaries would not have 
made any investment without the subsidies.  
         In order to understand whether the program was effective in reinforcing additional investment 
when the strictest notion of additionality is used, firms that would have less or no investment without 
incentives have been asked the following counterfactual question: 
 “What reasons would have led you to reduce or eliminate investments without the incentives? 
1) there would have been no return on the investment without the incentives 
2) there would have been no resources to finance investment without the incentives 
3) no response” 
 The answers to this question are reported in Table 4.11.  The first answer defines how many firms 
more likely have invested inefficiently meaning that for this number of firms an increase in investment 
cannot be considered as the evidence of the effectiveness of the program. From our questionnaire, we 
found that 30 (15 percent) subsidized firms consider their investment projects would not have been 
profitable without incentives.  The second answer reported in Table 4.11 aims to identify those 
!! 106!
financially constrained firms for which the effect of additionality of the program is relevant. Among 
204 firms that received subsidies under Law 6/99, only 40 of them (20 percent) would not have 
invested because of the lack of financial resources necessary for making these investments. These 
results suggest that a small amount of investment made by subsidized firms may be considered as 
additional investment if the strictest notion of additionality is used.  
Hence, it does not come as a surprise that the vast majority of firms (approximately 65 percent 
on average) that received subsidies in 2009 or 2010 believed that the policy failed to increase firm 
turnover neither in 2009–2010 nor in 2010-2011 (see Table 4.12). With respect to the effect of the 
subsidies on the number of employees, results obtained from firms’ subjective evaluation are very 
similar to those obtained from econometric analysis. For example, 67 percent of firms that received 
incentives in 2009 reported that they did not hire any employee in 2009-2010, while 74 percent of 
firms that received incentives in 2010 did not hire any additional employee in 2010-2011. Considering 
the longer effect of the subsidies on the number of additional employees, the results remain almost the 
same: 83 percent of firms subsidized in 2009 and 89 percent of firms subsidized in 2010 responded 
that they did not hire any employees in the following years. Finally, the subsidies prevented only 11 
percent of subsidized firms from decreasing the number of employees.   
            Now our analysis of the self-assessed impact of the program is focused on the population of 
non-treated firms. Results of the hypothetical effects of the subsidies under Law 6/99 on firm 
investment and turnover of non-subsidized firms are reported in Table 4.13. The results suggest that 
for the 67 percent of nonsubsidized firms the program would not have created any additional 
investment in 2010 and for the 88 percent them the program would not have increased their turnover in 
2010.  The same results are hold for the potential effect of the subsidies on the additional number of 
employees in 2010 and on the number of employees being prevented from losing their jobs in 2010: 
the vast majority, 99 percent, of nonsubsidized firms responded that there would have been no effect 
of obtaining on the number of employees in 2010. In general, among firms that did not participate in 
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the program 63 percent claim that nothing would have changed in the case if they received the 
subsidies under Law 6/99.  
           One remaining aspect that should be considered is why non-subsidized firms did not ask for the 
incentives under Law 6/99. This information is also relevant because it can help to reveal main 
advantages and drawbacks of the policy design and its implementation. The results reported in Table 
4.14 suggest that firms were well informed about existence of the program as only 9 percent of 
entrepreneurs responded that the main reason for non-applying was the lack of knowledge about the 
existence of the program. Another strength of the policy design is that the application procedure was 
simple enough since very few firms (2.6 percent) reported that the main motive for non-applying for 
the subsidies was that the procedure of documents preparation was burdensome. Concerning the 
program costs, it is beyond doubt that the program could be considered as not expensive one: only 0.3 
percent of non-subsidized firms reported that the main reason for not asking for the incentives was the 
high cost of the services of an accountant or a syndicate.  
             Table 4.14 reports the main reasons for non-asking for contributions: the majority of firms  
(51.6 percent) from the control group did not ask for contributions because they had not invested, 
while 13.4 percent of the control group did not ask for subsidies because they had financed their 
investments by their own resources. As can be seen from Table 4.14, 14 percent of firms could not 
obtain the subsidies because the policy was not targeted to their category.   
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4.3.5(Discussion(and(conclusions(
 
This paper estimates the effect of government subsidies given to microenterprises operating in 
the Province of Trento in 2009 and in 2010. The evaluation was carried out by using a nonparametric 
approach. First, treatment and control groups were constructed by implementing a propensity score 
matching technique. Comparing the propensity score distributions for treated and non-treated firms 
revealed that treated micro firms differ substantially from their non-subsidized counterparts in the 
number of pre-treatment subsidy requests. This means that microenterprises that asked subsidies more 
often in the previous years are more likely to receive the treatment. The main implication of this 
finding is that the program effect cannot be estimated for the whole sample of treated firms and must 
be confined to the sub-set of treated firms for which comparable untreated ones are available.  
The results from econometric analysis suggest that subsidies have not been able to improve 
firm performance or increase firm size in 2011. However, we found a positive effect of subsidies on 
the propensity to invest in training and in marketing and advertising in 2012. Because of the data 
limitations we cannot examine whether investment required by the program and investment in non-
physical capital compliment each other and whether they have a multiple effect on firm performance in 
the following years.  
As for the major policy issue of “picking winners”, the results obtained from the self-assessed 
impact survey on microenterprises suggest that about half of subsidized firms had their own internal 
resources necessary for financing investment. Furthermore, for the half of beneficiaries the policy was 
unsuccessful in reinforcing additional investment even if the least rigorous definition of additionality is 
used. When we restrict the definition of additionality only to those investments that would have not 
been feasible in the absence of the policy because of the presence of financial constraints, only 20 
percent of subsidized microenterprises might be deemed as those that made additional investment due 
to receiving the subsidies. This suggests that the subsidies under Law 6/99 were easy enough to obtain 
and the policy had little effect on pushing entrepreneurs to start more investment projects.  
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Overall, the empirical evidence reaffirms that this kind of capital subsidies granted to the 
business sector in general are ineffective in improving firm performance. The main drawback of this 
policy scheme is the lack of the well-designed selection process that picks and monitors firm activities 
capable to reinforce additional investment. Rodrik (2007) suggest that, in order to improve the policy 
design, the public authority must define clearly the determinants of policy success and observable 
criteria for scanning and recognizing it. Otherwise, there is a large probability that beneficiaries will 
find a way to receive subsidies despite poor outcomes. In addition, providing firms by incentives 
constantly over time without changing the eligibility criteria or imposing restrictions on the amount of 
possible subsidy requests results in fixing financial recourses in activities with zero pay-off.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Appendix(C(
!!!TABLE!4.1!DESCRIPTIVE!STATISTICS!FOR!SELECTED!VARIABLES!
Variable Description Treatment Control 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Number of 
employees 2008 
 3,005 2,396 0,835 1,486 
Value added 2008   in logarithms 11,734 1,076 10,673 1,118 
Revenues 2008        in logarithms 12,942 1,073 11,651 1,236 
Productivity 2008  
          
in logarithms 10,389 0,712 10,065 0,925 
Number of 
employees 2007             
 2,985 2,528 0,834 1,480 
Value added  2007          in logarithms 11,637 0,990 10,609 1,083 
Revenues  2007            in logarithms 12,882 1,136 11,536 1,298 
Productivity  2007 in logarithms 10,314 0,595 10,038 0,848 
Male owner  =1  if the owner is 
male, 0 otherwise 
0,877 0,329 0,817 0,387 
Family firm =1 if the firm is a 
family one, o 
otherwise 
0,630 0,484 0,484 0,500 
Client of multiple 
banks          
=1 if the firm is a 
client of more than 
one bank, 0 
otherwise  
0,549 0,499 0,260 0,439 
Type of the main 
bank: Cassa Rurale 
=1 if the principal 
bank is "Cassa 
Rurale", 0 otherwise 
0,137 0,345 0,797 0,403 
A membership in 
the association 
=1 if the firm has a 
membership in one 
of the following 
associations:Confind
ustria, 
Confcommercio, 
Associazione 
Artigiani;  
0 otherwise 
0,828 0,379 0,710 0,454 
Single firm owner   =1 if the firm is 
managed by one 
owner, 0 otherwise 
0,559 0,498 0,722 0,448 
Wholesale and 
retail trade* 
Sector of economic  
activity 
0,134 0,342 0,262 0,440 
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TABLE!4.1!(CONTINUED)!DESCRIPTIVE!STATISTICS!FOR!SELECTED!VARIABLES!! !
Construction        Sector of economic  
activity 
0,274 0,447 0,227 0,419 
Manufacturing           Sector of economic  
activity 
0,296 0,458 0,086 0,281 
Metallurgy          Sector of economic  
activity 
0,156 0,364 0,060 0,238 
Services and 
Transport            
Sector of economic  
activity 
0,140 0,348 0,364 0,481 
Motive: 
Entrepreneurial 
spirit* 
=1 if the main 
motive for business 
establishment is an 
entrepreneurial spirit, 
0 otherwise  
 
0,276 0,448 0,250 0,433 
Motive: Family 
tradition    
=1 if the main 
motive for business 
establishment is 
continuing a family 
tradition, 0 otherwise  
 
0,417 0,494 0,270 0,444 
Motive: Job 
substitution  
=1 if the main 
motive for business 
establishment is job 
substitution, 0 
otherwise  
 
0,307 0,462 0,480 0,500 
Young owner        =1 if the owner is 
younger than 48 
years, 0 otherwise         
0,554 0,498 0,521 0,500 
Firm age <=10* =1 if the firm age is 
less or equal to 10, 0 
otherwise  
0,330 0,471 0,260 0,439 
Firm age  (10; 40]  =1 if the firm age is 
more than 10 and 
less or equal to 40, 0 
otherwise  
0,640 0,481 0,701 0,458 
Firm age (40; 181]  =1 if the firm age is 
more than 40 and 
less or equal to 181, 
0 otherwise  
0,030 0,170 0,039 0,193 
Note: *Category excluded in regression (base category). 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
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TABLE!4.2!ESTIMATION!OF!THE!PROPENSITY!SCORE!FOR!THE!TREATMENT:!SUBSIDIZED!FIRMS!IN!ONE!OF!THE!YEARS!
2009,!2010!
 
 
Number of employees 2008 0.442 
 
(1.18) 
Value added   2008 -1.222 
 
(-0.93) 
Revenues  2008    1.422** 
 
(3.05) 
Productivity 2008 1.344 
 
(1.01) 
Number of employees 2007 -0.0967 
 
(-0.26) 
Value added  2007 0.828 
 
(0.62) 
Revenues  2007 -0.824 
 
(-1.72) 
Productivity  2007 -1.141 
 
(-0.85) 
Number of subsidy requests: 0 Ref. 
Number of subsidy requests: 1       3.320*** 
 
(8.55) 
Number of subsidy requests: 2       3.021*** 
 
(5.83) 
Number of subsidy requests: 3       3.823*** 
 
(6.41) 
Number of subsidy requests: 4 1.465 
 
(1.61) 
Number of subsidy requests: 5        4.823*** 
 
(4.41) 
Number of subsidy requests: 6 1.927 
 
(1.75) 
Individual firm owner -0.967* 
 
(-2.08) 
Wholesale and retail trade Ref. 
Construction 0.393 
 
(0.83) 
Manufacturing 1.047* 
 
(2.18) 
Metallurgy 0.341 
 
(0.62) 
Services and Transport 0.889 
 
(1.95) 
Young owner -0.071 
 
(-0.24) !!!!!
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TABLE!4.2!(CONTINUED)!ESTIMATION!OF!THE!PROPENSITY!SCORE!FOR!THE!TREATMENT:!SUBSIDIZED!FIRMS!IN!ONE!
OF!THE!YEARS!2009,!2010! !
Firm age  [4; 10] Ref. 
Firm age (10; 40]  -0.685* 
 
(-2.09) 
Firm age (40; 181]       -2.726** 
 (-2.93) 
Male owner 0.118 
 (0.28) 
Family firm 0.052 
 
(0.17) 
Motive: Entrepreneurial spirit Ref. 
Motive: Family tradition   -0.377 
 
  (-0.98) 
Motive: Job substitution  -0.473 
 
 (-1.38) 
Client of multiple banks  0.295 
 
 (0.97) 
Type of the principal bank: Cassa Rurale        -3.617*** 
 
   (-11.13) 
A membership in the association 0.316 
 
(0.88) 
_cons    -6.991** 
N 
(2.7) 
1485 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
Note: t statistics in parentheses; the number of observations is 1366.!!
The dependent variable is 1 if the company receives a public subsidy either in 2009 or in 2010, and 0 otherwise.  
Estimation carried out with a logistic regression model. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
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TABLE!4.3!BALANCE!TESTS!IN!MATCHED!SAMPLE(
 
Unmatched Mean !! %reduct t-test 
Variable          Matched Treated Control %bias bias t    p>t 
 !! !! !! !!Number of employees 2008                
U 3.087   1.0249 102.3 
!
14.42  0.000 
M 2.6063   2.5906 0.8 99.2 0.06  0.954 
Value added   2008       
U 
 
11.775   10.759 
 
100.6 !
 
11.86  0.000 
M 11.593   11.633 -3.9 96.1 -0.32  0.752 
Revenues  2008           
U 
 
12.997   11.812 
 
107.4 !
 
12.17  0.000 
M 12.784   12.759 2.3 97.8 0.20  0.839 
Productivity 2008          
U 
 
10.419   10.104 
 
43.5 !
 
4.72  0.000 
M 10.362   10.418 -7.8 82.1 -0.71  0.481 
Number of employees 2007    !  
U 3.0497   1.0299 96.1 
!
13.92  0.000 
M     2.5118   2.4999 0.6 99.4 0.04  0.965 
Value added  2007          
U 
 
11.658   10.768 
 
91.5 !
 
10.76  0.000 
M 11.486   11.527 -4.2 95.4 -0.33  0.742 
Revenues  2007         
U 
 
12.933   11.804 
 
100.1 !
 
11.48  0.000 
M 12.723   12.713 0.8 99.2 0.07  0.944 
Productivity  2007          
U 
 
10.326    10.11 
 
32.4 !
 
3.48  0.001 
M 10.287   10.336 -7.5 76.9 -0.62  0.535 
Number of subsidy   !  
 requests: 0    
                                   
Ref. 
Number of subsidy   !  requests: 1            
U                              
 
.3913   .08306 
 
77.6 !
 
11.89  0.000 
M .30709   .29791 2.3 97.0 0.16  0.874 
 
Number of subsidy    !  
requests: 2                                       !  
U .12422   .03239 34.6 
 
5.44  0.000 
M .13386   .11466 7.2 79.1 0.46  0.644 
Number of subsidy    !  requests: 3                                       !  
U .1118   .01495 40.4 
!
7.34  0.000 
M .11024   .08494 10.6 73.9 0.68  0.499 !!!!
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TABLE!4.3!(CONTINUED)!BALANCE!TESTS!IN!MATCHED!SAMPLE(!
Number of subsidy    !  requests: 4                                          !  
U  .02484   .00914 12.1 
!
1.80  0.073 
M .0315   .01763 10.7 11.7 0.71  0.477 
 
Number of subsidy    !  
requests: 5                                       !  
U .03106   .00249 22.3 
!
4.49  0.000 
M .01575   .03623 -16.0 28.3 -1.02  0.307 
 
Number of subsidy    !  
requests: 6                                        !  U .03106   .00249 22.3 
!
4.49  0.000 
M .03937   .01128 21.9 1.6 1.43  0.155 
! ! ! ! !Individual firm owner              !  
U .52174   .67359 -31.3 
!
-3.83  0.000 
M .55906   .61329 -11.2 64.3 -0.88  0.382 
 
Wholesale and retail trade  
 
Ref. 
Construction          
U .25466   .23007 5.7 !
0.69  0.489 
M .26772   .22035 11.0 -92.6 0.88  0.381 
Manufacturing           
U .27329   .09635 46.7 !
6.66  0.000 
M .23622   .18639 13.2 71.8 0.97  0.333 
Metallurgy            
U .14907   .07143 24.9 !
3.41  0.001 
M .13386     .118 5.1 79.6 0.38  0.705 
Services and Transport            !  
U .19876   .30897 -25.5 
!
-2.88  0.004 
M .22835   .31593 -20.3 20.5 -1.57  0.118 
 
Young owner           
U 
.60248   .52575 15.5 
!
1.83  0.067 
M .58268    .5634 3.9 74.9 0.31  0.757 
       Firm age  [4; 10]         Ref. 
Firm age  (10; 40]        
U .6646   .72924 -14.1 !
-1.72  0.086 
M .66142   .66538 -0.9 93.9 -0.07  0.947 
Firm age (40; 181]        
U .03106    .0407 -5.2 !
-0.59  0.556 
M .03937   .02359 8.5 -63.7 0.72  0.473 
 
Male owner           
U 
 
.87578   .82226 
 
15.0 !
 
1.69  0.091 
M .86614   .84235 6.7 55.5 0.54  0.593 
Family firm           
U .62733    .5407 17.6 !
2.08  0.038 
M .59843   .53779 12.3 30.0 0.97  0.331 
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!
TABLE!4.3!(CONTINUED)!BALANCE!TESTS!IN!MATCHED!SAMPLE(!!
 
Motive: Entrepreneurial 
spirit 
 Ref. !  
 
Motive: Family tradition     !  
U              .41615   .30897 22.4 
!
2.74  0.006 
M .37008   .31197 12.1 45.8 0.97  0.331 
  
 
Motive: Job substitution         !  
U .3354   .46844 -27.3 
!
-3.19  0.001 
M .37795   .38899 -2.3 91.7 -0.18  0.857 
 
Client of multiple banks           !  
U .54658   .28405 55.2 
!
6.84  0.000 
M .51181   .53305 -4.5 91.9 -0.34  0.736 
 
Type of the principal       !  
bank: Cassa Rurale 
U .15528   .81977 -177.6 !
-20.72  0.000 
M .19685   .19753 -0.2 99.9 -0.01  0.989 
 
A membership in  ! ! ! !
the association        
! ! ! !U .87578   .72924 37.4 
!
4.04  0.000 
M .87402   .90211 -7.2 80.8 -0.71  0.480 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
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TABLE!4.4!ESTIMATION!OF!AVERAGE!TREATMENT!EFFECTS!ON!TREATED!FOR!THE!SUB<POPULATION!OF!FIRMS!(P<
SCORE!≤!0.25)!
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables 
Propensity 
to Invest 
2012 
Propensity 
to Invest in 
Phys.cap 
 2012 
Propensity 
to Invest in 
Non-
phys.cap. 
2012 
Employees 
2011 
Value 
added 2011 
Revenues 
2011 
Product. 
2011 
        Treated 0.116 0.092  0.162***     0.129 0.154 0.100 0.103 
 (0.080) (0.078)   (0.057) (0.150) (0.117) (0.099) (0.113) 
Number of 
employees 2008 0.076 0.054     0.029   0.654*** 0.007 0.070 -0.018 
 (0.050) (0.048) (0.036) (0.093) (0.072) (0.061) (0.070) Value added 
2008 -0.204 -0.157 -0.123     0.197  0.708*** -0.030 0.031 
 (0.155) (0.151) (0.111) (0.290) (0.226) (0.191) (0.220) Revenues 2008 0.071* 0.070* 0.032   0.182** 0.295***  0.788***   0.239*** 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.028) (0.073) (0.057) (0.048) (0.056) Productivity 
2008 0.246 0.194 0.163 -0.140 -0.404* -0.002 0.257 
 (0.153) (0.149) (0.110) (0.286) (0.223) (0.189) (0.217) 
Number of 
employees 2007 -0.051 -0.046 -0.020 0.231** 0.020 -0.074 0.052 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.035) (0.092) (0.071) (0.060) (0.069) Value added 
2007 0.194 0.191 0.153 -0.214 0.260 0.203 0.048 
 (0.153) (0.150) (0.110) (0.287) (0.224) (0.189) (0.217) Revenues 2007 -0.056 -0.058 -0.033 -0.057 -0.238*** 0.045   -0.217*** 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.028) (0.074) (0.058) (0.049) (0.056) Productivity 
2007 -0.191 -0.177 -0.178 0.145 0.095 -0.147 0.322 
 (0.151) (0.148) (0.109) (0.284) (0.221) (0.187) (0.215) 
Number of 
attempts: 0 Ref. 
        Number of 
attempts: 1 0.018 0.035 -0.020 -0.001 0.112 0.053 0.109 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.034) (0.090) (0.070) (0.059) (0.068) Number of 
attempts: 2 0.097 0.079 0.062 0.031 0.016 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.072) (0.070) (0.052) (0.135) (0.105) (0.089) (0.102) Number of 
attempts: 3 0.089 0.097 0.073 0.019 0.043 -0.071 -0.011 
 (0.111) (0.108) (0.079) (0.207) (0.161) (0.137) (0.157) Number of 
attempts: 4 0.171 0.187 -0.010 0.100 -0.154 -0.036 -0.283 
 (0.131) (0.128) (0.094) (0.245) (0.191) (0.161) (0.185) Number of 
attempts: 5 0.748* 0.786** 0.813*** -0.204 0.094 -0.035 0.164 
 (0.410) (0.400) (0.295) (0.768) (0.598) (0.506) (0.581) Number of 
attempts: 6 -0.271 -0.271 -0.157 0.906* 0.405 0.050 0.043 
 (0.285) (0.278) (0.205) (0.534) (0.416) (0.352) (0.404) Single owner -0.085* -0.066 -0.004 -0.070 0.102 -0.001    0.188*** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.034) (0.088) (0.069) (0.058) (0.067) !
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TABLE!4.4!(CONTINUED)!ESTIMATION!OF!AVERAGE!TREATMENT!EFFECTS!ON!TREATED!FOR!THE!SUB<POPULATION!
OF!FIRMS!(P<SCORE!≤!0.25)! !
Wholesale and 
retail trade Ref. 
Construction -0.029 -0.025 -0.041 -0.104 -0.007 -0.045 0.030 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.027) (0.070) (0.055) (0.046) (0.053) Manufacturing 0.085* 0.102** 0.015 -0.042 0.017 -0.029 0.015 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.034) (0.088) (0.069) (0.058) (0.067) Metallurgy 0.041 0.029 -0.024 -0.147 -0.088 -0.113* -0.076 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.038) (0.098) (0.076) (0.065) (0.074) Services & 
Transport 0.069** 0.056* 0.043* -0.060 -0.071 -0.121*** -0.053 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.025) (0.065) (0.051) (0.043) (0.049) Young owner 0.060** 0.050** 0.049*** -0.021 0.057 0.026 0.067* 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.018) (0.047) (0.036) (0.031) (0.035) Firm age [4;10] Ref. 
Firm age  
(10; 41] -0.073** -0.062** -0.042* -0.094* -0.063 0.001 -0.042 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.022) (0.057) (0.044) (0.037) (0.043) Firm age 
(41;181] -0.161** -0.135** -0.097** -0.083 -0.096 -0.013 -0.099 
 (0.066) (0.065) (0.048) (0.124) (0.097) (0.082) (0.094) Male 0.028 0.034 0.023 -0.004 0.031 0.002 0.040 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.023) (0.060) (0.047) (0.040) (0.046) Family firm 0.014 0.017 -0.011 -0.027 0.045 -0.049 0.057 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.020) (0.052) (0.040) (0.034) (0.039) Motive: 
Entrepreneurial 
spirit 
Ref. 
Motive: 
Continuing 
family tradition 
-0.003 -0.012 0.005 0.014 0.003 0.004 -0.004 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.026) (0.067) (0.052) (0.044) (0.050) Motive: 
Substitution of a 
paid job 
0.025 0.023 0.029 0.098* 0.106** -0.012 0.073* 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.022) (0.057) (0.045) (0.038) (0.043) 
Being a client 
of several banks 0.053* 0.050* 0.062*** 0.034 0.032 0.000 0.011 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.020) (0.053) (0.041) (0.035) (0.040) Cassa Rurale -0.000 0.002 0.021 0.099 0.058 0.021 0.019 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.025) (0.065) (0.051) (0.043) (0.049) 
Membership in 
the association 0.035 0.028 0.022 0.072 0.036 0.051 0.028 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.020) (0.052) (0.040) (0.034) (0.039) Constant -0.465** -0.519*** -0.157 -1.196*** 2.587*** 1.604*** 2.884*** 
 (0.194) (0.190) (0.140) (0.364) (0.283) (0.240) (0.275) Observations 1,169 1,169 1,169 1,169 1,169 1,169 1,169 
R-squared 0.086 0.081 0.082 0.790 0.682 0.823 0.478 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The outcomes (2) and (3) refer to firm propensity to invest in physical and non-physical capital respectively in 2012. 
Investment in physical capital includes investment in machinery, land and buildings, and in innovation. Investment in non-physical capital includes 
investment in training and in marketing and advertising.  
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento  
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TABLE!4.5!ESTIMATION!OF!AVERAGE!TREATMENT!EFFECTS!ON!TREATED!FOR!THE!TOTAL!POPULATION!OF!FIRMS!(P<
SCORE!<!1)!
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables 
Propensity 
to Invest 
2012 
Propensity 
to Invest in 
Phys.cap. 
 2012 
Propensity 
to Invest in 
Non-
phys.cap. 
2012 
Employees 
2011 
Value added 
2011 
Revenues 
2011 
Product. 
2011 
              Treated 0.058 0.036 0.164*** 0.089 0.079 0.105* 0.035 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.035)   (0.098) (0.066) (0.055) (0.063) Number of 
employees 
2008 0.083** 0.067* 0.039     0.659***  0.000 0.035 -0.009 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.030) (0.083) (0.056) (0.046) (0.053) Value added 
2008 -0.216 -0.164 -0.155 0.084 0.704*** 0.050 0.044 
 (0.136) (0.133) (0.101) (0.282) (0.191) (0.157) (0.181) Revenues 2008 0.063* 0.056 0.026 0.302*** 0.291*** 0.779*** 0.202*** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.028) (0.079) (0.053) (0.044) (0.051) Productivity 
2008   0.276** 0.224*    0.201** 0.000   -0.376** -0.073 0.259 
 (0.133) (0.130) (0.099) (0.277) (0.187) (0.154) (0.178) Number of 
employees 
2007   -0.090**  -0.083** -0.039   0.173**    -0.032 -0.046 -0.007 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.029) (0.080) (0.054) (0.045) (0.051) Value added 
2007 0.272** 0.253* 0.183*    -0.076   0.373** 0.121     0.156 
 (0.133) (0.130) (0.099) (0.277) (0.187) (0.154) (0.178) Revenues 2007 -0.048 -0.047 -0.021 -0.148* -0.238*** 0.059 -0.197*** 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.029) (0.080) (0.054) (0.045) (0.052) Productivity 
2007 -0.286** -0.262** -0.214** -0.008 -0.047 -0.087 0.200 
 (0.131) (0.129) (0.097) (0.273) (0.185) (0.152) (0.176) 
Number of 
attempts: 0 Ref. 
Number of 
attempts: 1 -0.003 0.017 -0.057* -0.073 0.045 0.023 0.039 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.030) (0.083) (0.056) (0.046) (0.053) Number of 
attempts: 2 0.080 0.087 0.019 0.067 0.099 0.039 0.045 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.044) (0.123) (0.083) (0.069) (0.079) Number of 
attempts: 3 0.047 0.076 -0.060 0.049 0.143 0.012 0.106 
 (0.075) (0.073) (0.056) (0.156) (0.105) (0.087) (0.100) Number of 
attempts: 4 0.131 0.155 -0.018 0.313 -0.046 -0.002 -0.194 
 (0.112) (0.109) (0.083) (0.232) (0.157) (0.129) (0.149) Number of 
attempts: 5 0.307** 0.337** 0.299*** 0.970*** 0.390* 0.304* 0.151 
 (0.151) (0.148) (0.112) (0.314) (0.213) (0.175) (0.202) Number of 
attempts: 6 -0.027 0.009 0.129 0.846*** 0.245 0.130 -0.035 
 (0.150) (0.147) (0.111) (0.311) (0.211) (0.174) (0.200) Single owner -0.042 -0.020 -0.019 -0.098 0.147** 0.002 0.233*** 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.032) (0.089) (0.060) (0.050) (0.057) !!
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TABLE!4.5!(CONTINUED)!ESTIMATION!OF!AVERAGE!TREATMENT!EFFECTS!ON!TREATED!FOR!THE!TOTAL!POPULATION!
OF!FIRMS!(P<SCORE!<!1)!
Wholesale and 
retail trade Ref.  
Construction -0.020 -0.014 -0.041 -0.084 -0.005 -0.054 0.034 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.027) (0.076) (0.051) (0.042) (0.049) Manufacturing 0.097** 0.107** -0.008 -0.015 0.008 -0.025 0.006 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.032) (0.089) (0.060) (0.049) (0.057) Metallurgy 0.037 0.017 -0.012 -0.163 -0.137** -0.116** -0.105* 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.035) (0.099) (0.067) (0.055) (0.064) Services & 
Transport 0.081** 0.071** 0.045* -0.071 -0.076 
-
0.123*** -0.058 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.025) (0.071) (0.048) (0.040) (0.046) Young owner 0.045* 0.035 0.049*** 0.021 0.053 0.017 0.048 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.018) (0.050) (0.034) (0.028) (0.032) Firm age 
[4;10] Ref. 
Firm age 
(10; 41] -0.048* -0.040 -0.023 -0.154*** -0.076* -0.012 -0.033 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.021) (0.059) (0.040) (0.033) (0.038) Firm age 
(41;181] -0.125* -0.104* -0.077 -0.072 -0.068 -0.011 -0.069 
 (0.064) (0.063) (0.048) (0.133) (0.090) (0.074) (0.086) Male 0.046 0.047 0.028 -0.061 0.007 -0.002 0.026 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.023) (0.065) (0.044) (0.036) (0.042) Family firm 0.010 0.015 -0.011 -0.044 0.037 -0.041 0.048 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.019) (0.054) (0.037) (0.030) (0.035) Motive: 
Entrepreneurial 
spirit 
Ref.  
Motive: 
Continuing 
family 
tradition -0.017 -0.022 -0.013 -0.021     -0.003 0.006 -0.010 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.025) (0.070) (0.047) (0.039) (0.045) Motive: 
Substitution of 
a paid job 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.073   0.085** -0.007 0.056 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.022) (0.061) (0.041) (0.034) (0.039) Being a client 
of several 
banks      0.075*** 0.082*** 0.069*** 0.102* 0.053 0.016 0.016 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.020) (0.056) (0.038) (0.031) (0.036) Cassa Rurale -0.011 -0.007 0.020 -0.010 0.042 0.002 0.032 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.022) (0.062) (0.042) (0.034) (0.040) 
Membership in 
the association 0.045* 0.033 0.028 0.156*** 0.073* 0.062** 0.042 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.020) (0.056) (0.038) (0.031) (0.036) Constant -0.521*** -0.543*** -0.198 -1.477*** 2.682*** 1.694*** 3.029*** 
 (0.191) (0.187) (0.142) (0.397) (0.269) (0.221) (0.255) Observations 1,365 1,365 1,365 1,365 1,365 1,365 1,365 
R-squared 0.094 0.090 0.100 0.800 0.715 0.850 0.472 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The outcomes (2) and (3) refer to firm propensity to invest in physical and non-physical capital respectively in 2012. 
Investment in physical capital includes investment in machinery, land and buildings, and in innovation. Investment in non-physical capital includes 
investment in training and in marketing and advertising.  
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
 !
!! 121!
TABLE!4.6!MAIN!SOURCES!OF!INFORMATION!ON!THE!PROGRAM!
 
  !! Number of firms Percent.  
Business 
consultant 92 45,32 
Sectoral 
association 74 36,45 
APIAE 
information 
materials 
13 6,4 
Other 23 11,83 
Total  202 100 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE!4.7!SELF<ASSESSMENT!OF!THE!PROBABILITY!TO!RECEIVE!THE!TREATMENT!!
 
 
 
Number of firms Percent.  
Small possibility 13 6,4 
Some possibility 87 43,1 
Large possibility 48 23,8 
Certainty  41 20,3 
No idea 13 6,4 
Total  202 100 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
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TABLE!4.8!SELF<ASSESSED!EFFECT!OF!CONTRIBUTIONS!ON!FIRM!INVESTMENT!!
 
 
 
Number of firms Percent.  
Yes 143 72,22 
No 55 22,78 
Total 198 100 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE!4.9!MOTIVES!FOR!ASKING!THE!SUBSIDIES!
 
 Number of firms Percent.  
Lack of internal resources 90 46,9 
Had enough resources but 
wanted to try 102 53,1 
Total 192 100 
   
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!! 123!
TABLE!4.10!HYPOTHETICAL!DECISIONS!OF!THE!SUBSIDIZED!MICROFIRMS!WITHOUT!INCENTIVES!
 
 Number of firms Percent. 
Same amount of investment, in the same projects 115 58.67 
Same amount of investment but in different 
projects 
1 0.51 
Less investment 54 27.55 
No investment 26 13.27 
Total 196 100.00 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
TABLE!4.11!REASONS!FOR!REDUCING!OR!ELIMINATING!INVESTMENT!WITHOUT!SUBSIDIES!
 
 
 Number of firms Percent. 
Unsubsidized investment not profitable 30 42.86 
Projects profitable but financial resources are unavailable 40 57.14 
Total 70 100.00 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
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TABLE!4.12!SELF<ASSESSED!EFFECT!OF!THE!SUBSIDIES!ON!FIRM!TURNOVER!AND!EMPLOYMENT!
 
 Number of firms Percent. 
Turnover increased in 2009-2010 
Yes in 2009 1 1.18 
Yes in 2010 11 12.94 
No 55 64.71 
Yes both in 2009 and 2010 18 21.18 
Total 85 100.00 
Turnover increased in 2010-2011 
Yes in 2009 2 1.74 
Yes in 2010 15 13.04 
No 77 66.96 
Yes both in 2009 and 2010 21 18.26 
Total 115 100.00 
Additional employees in 2009-2010 
0 57 67.06 
1 15 17.65 
2 9 10.59 
3 1 1.18 
4 3 3.53 
Total 85 100.00 
Additional employees in 2010-2011 
0 86 74.14 
1 18 15.52 
2 9 7.76 
3 3 2.59 
Total 116 100.00 
Additional employees after 2010 
0 70 83.33 
1 11 13.10 
2 2 2.38 
3 1 1.19 
Total 84 100.00 
Additional employees after 2011 
0 103 88.79 
1 11 9.48 
2 1 0.86 
3 1 0.86 
Total 116 100.00 
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TABLE!4.12!(CONTINUED)!SELF<ASSESSED!EFFECT!OF!THE!SUBSIDIES!ON!FIRM!TURNOVER!AND!EMPLOYMENT!!
The potential prevent of employment decrease without subsidies 
0 173 88.72 
1 12 6.15 
2 8 4.10 
3 2 1.03 
Total 195 100.00 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
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Table!4.13!Hypothetical!decisions!of!the!non<subsidized!microfirms!in!the!case!of!receiving!incentives!
 
 Number of firms Percent. 
Investment increased in 2010 
Yes 439 32.54 
No 910 67.46 
Total 1349 100.00 
Turnover increased in 2010 
Yes in 2009 166 12.31 
No 1183 87.69 
Total 1349 100.00 
Improved financial situation in 2010 
Yes 176 13.05 
No 1173 86.95 
Total 1349 100.00 
New employees in 2010 
Yes 63 4.67 
No 1285 95.33 
Total 1348 100.00 
The potential prevent of employment decrease with subsidies 
Yes 16 1.19 
No 1333 98.81 
Total 8 100.00 
Nothing changed 
Yes 504 37.36 
No 845 62.62 
Total 1349 100.00 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
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Table!4.14!Main!motives!for!non<asking!for!the!subsidies!
 
 Number of firms Percent. 
Application procedure is time-consuming 39 2.55 
High costs of the services of an accountant 
or a syndicate 
4 0.26 
Did not know 142 9.29 
Did not invest 789 51.64 
Self-financed investment 205 13.42 
No contributions for my category 217 14.20 
Asked for contribution in previous years 45 2.95 
The application was rejected 19 1.24 
Accepted but did not receive 13 0.85 
Going to close the enterprise 14 1.92 
Other 41 2.68 
Total 1528 100.00 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
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!
Figure!4.1!Propensity!score!distribution!among!subsidized!and!non8subsidized!firms!!!
 !
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
 
 
Figure!4.2!Propensity!score!histogram!by!treatment!status!!
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
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Figure!4.3!Distribution!of!a!number!of!pre8treatment!subsidy!requests!among!subsidized!and!non8
subsidized!firms!!
!
Source: Own calculations based on data from Servizio Statistica della Provincia Autonoma di Trento 
 ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Chapter(V!
Conclusions(
The preceding chapters of the doctoral thesis have investigated how entrepreneurial perceptions 
and learning can influence entrepreneur behavior and firm performance. Entrepreneurial perceptions 
are heterogeneous and evolving over time so that some entrepreneurs can have perceptions that are 
very close to the real values of some phenomena, while perceptions of others can suffer from 
substantial biases. Entrepreneurial learning might also be interpreted not only as a process of updating 
entrepreneurial knowledge about her business abilities from experience but also as a source of firm 
opportunistic behavior. Entrepreneurial perceptions and learning can evoke different types of actions 
and, consequently, these actions can influence firm performance in various ways.  
The main objective of my the second chapter is to examine whether the effectiveness of the 
policy is altered by the behavioral assumption that entrepreneurs are overconfident about their 
entrepreneurial abilities and tend to be overoptimistic in the evaluation of future prospects. In order to 
test my main hypothesis, the chapter introduces the agent-based model that is a modified version of the 
financial fragility model of Delli Gatti et al. (2005).  Entrepreneurs make decisions about future 
investment evaluating expected profits, which are also influenced by entrepreneurs’ beliefs about their 
business abilities in such a way that the younger are the entrepreneurs, the more overconfident about 
their talent and the more willing to take the risky projects they must be. In this framework, since start-
ups are more financially constrained than incumbents, the public authority intervenes by guaranteeing 
part of start-ups loans. The main goal of this intervention is to reduce the burden of their financing 
costs.  
Overall, my simulation results suggest that the presence of misperceptions of entrepreneurial 
abilities influence the policy outcomes. Specifically, I found that, at the industry level, policy 
implementation had no effect on the average interest rate in the presence of overconfidence, while in 
its absence a positive effect has been detected. Furthermore, although the policy implementation had a 
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positive effect on firm investment in general, firm investment was much lower in the presence of 
overconfidence that in its absence. Finally, higher misperception pushed more firms to exit. This 
suggests, that the excess entry of too overconfident entrepreneurs resulted in a higher firm exit rate that 
at the same time had a negative affect on the aggregate credit supply and, consequently, led to creation 
of financial constraints for the most efficient firms. 
The third chapter aims to explore what strategies microfirms adopt when they are faced with 
different levels of competition. The choice of revealed competitive strategy is based on three options: 
to follow cost leadership, to follow differentiation, or to decide not to take any action to competition. 
A microfirm strategy is deemed to be a cost leadership strategy if the firm owner evaluates as very 
important a possibility to offer prices lower than those of competitors. We assume that microfirms 
adopt a differentiation strategy if they invest at least in one of the flowing types of investment: 
investment in R&D, marketing and advertising, and training.  
The results of the analysis presented in Chapter 3 suggest that perceived threat of competition 
pushes firms to take actions. The preferences for actions are explained by available resources. In 
particular, the preference for a differentiation strategy is determined by human capital and the age of 
entrepreneur, so that this kind of action is more likely to be taken by younger entrepreneurs with 
higher level of education and previous entrepreneurial experience. At the same time, the existence of 
previous entrepreneurial experience is negatively associated with the probability to choose a cost 
leadership strategy. In addition, I accomplish my analysis by testing whether the choice of certain 
strategy results in better firm performance measured by labor productivity growth in 2010 and 2011. I 
did not find any statistically significant effect of a preference for a certain competitive strategy on firm 
performance.  
The main purpose of the fourth chapter is to investigate the effect of incentives on 
microfirms’ investment activities and their performance in the province of Trento. The evaluation was 
carried out by using a nonparametric approach. First, treatment and control groups were constructed by 
implementing a propensity score matching technique. Comparing the propensity score distributions for 
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treated and non-treated firms revealed that treated microfirms differ substantially from their non-
subsidized counterparts in the number of applications for subsidy made before. This means that 
microenterprises that asked subsidies more often in the previous years are more likely to receive the 
treatment. The main implication of this finding is that the program effect cannot be estimated for the 
whole sample of treated firms and must be confined to the sub-set of treated firms for which 
comparable untreated ones are available. 
The results from econometric analysis suggest that subsidies have not been able to improve 
firm performance or increase firm size in 2011. However, I found a positive effect of subsidies on the 
propensity to invest in training and in marketing and advertising in 2012. Because of the data 
limitations I cannot examine whether investment required by the program and investment in non-
physical capital compliment each other and whether they have a multiple effect on firm performance in 
the following years.  
The results obtained from the self-assessed impact survey on microenterprises suggest that 
about half of subsidized firms had their own internal resources necessary for financing investment. 
Furthermore, for the half of beneficiaries the policy was unsuccessful in reinforcing additional 
investment even if the least rigorous definition of additionality is used. When I restrict the definition of 
additionality only to those investments that would have not been feasible in the absence of the policy 
because of the presence of financial constraints, only 20 percent of subsidized microenterprises might 
be deemed as those that made additional investment due to receiving the subsidies. This suggests that 
the subsidies under Law 6/99 were quite easy to receive and the policy had little effect on pushing 
entrepreneurs to start more investment projects.  
Several policy implications can be derived from my thesis. First, the policy design should be 
based on highly selective mechanisms in order to avoid wasting of public funds. Without careful 
firms’ scanning, policy implementation might distort the post-entry market selection of the most 
efficient entrepreneurs. Second, policy makers have to change constantly the eligibility criteria and 
need to impose restrictions on the amount of possible subsidy applications. Otherwise, receiving public 
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subsidies can be pursued as a goal by granted firms. Finally, my results suggest that policies aimed to 
foster entrepreneurship education can be considered as an essential instrument of government 
intervention. In particular, entrepreneurship education can prevent from excess entry of overconfident 
entrepreneurs by a means of reduction of talent misperception by individuals.  
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